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CONSER VATORSHIP OF ROULEfl CIVIL
COMMITMENT AND DUE PROCESS IN
CALIFORNIA
by Deborah B Klstein*
and Daryl . Weinroth**
Introduction
So long as man' lived alone, he had full freedom of choice. When
he began to commune with others, however, it became necessary to
give up some individual freedoms so as to enjoy the benefits of the
group. The larger the group became, the more freedoms man had to
surrender and the more order was imposed upon each individual. We
accept the imposition of order and we question it. We want more bene-
fits and more freedoms.
Two of the strongest sources of power to impose order in the
United States are the power ofparenspariae2 , the concept of the state
as parent, and the state's police power,3 the power to protect society. A
major problem with both sources is that it is difficult to determine at
what point the desire for order must be restrained out of respect for
individual liberties. It has been held that fewer safeguards are required
under the parens patriae power to insure individual freedom because
the state is acting in the best interests of the individual.' But it is diffi-
cult to know where the best interests of the individual leave off and the
convenience of order begins.
There are some people with less order in their lives than most:
people whose decision-making faculties are impaired; people whose
mental capabilities are different; and people who are incapable of sur-
viving in society without aid.' These people require more order than
* A.B., 1976, University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 1979, Hastings College of the
Law, University of California.
** B.S., 1977, University of California, Berkeley; member third year class.
1. For the purposes of this note, the masculine gender will be used to refer to members
of both sexes.
2. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text infra.
3. Discussed in detail in Note, Developments in the Law: Civil Commitment of the Men-
tally III, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1190 (1974). See also notes 27-28 and acc6mpanying text infra.
4. Pee v. United States, 274 F.2d 556 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
5. "Let us define mental health as the adjustment of human beings to the world and to
each other with a maximum effectiveness and happiness. Not just efficiency, or just content-
ment, or the grace of obeying the rules of the game cheerfully. It is all of these together. It is
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they are capable of providing for themselves. The state will not let
them die or suffer, but it does not want them to embarrass, harm, or
burden the rest of society. Thus, society acknowledges that there is a
need for mental health care.
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act6 (hereinafter LPS Act or Act) is
California's attempt to strike a balance between society's need for pro-
tection and the mentally disordered individual's right to freedom. In
addition to providing for the detention of persons classified as danger-
ous to others and gravely disabled,7 the Act contains some safeguards
for the individual. Emergency commitments may be challenged by
habeas corpus proceedings,8 and the Act recognizes the individual's
right to a jury trial.9 However, the LPS Act has no provisions detailing
appropriate due process requirements. While it does outline the pro-
gressive stages of detention-initial 72-hour observation period,10 14-
day involuntary treatment period,"1 90-day post-certification period'
2
and conservatorshipl 3I-it does not address the appropriate standard of
proof and jury verdict requirements necessary for commitment or con-
servatorship.
The developing case law which addresses these problems indicates
the need for more clearly defined standards of due process relating to
the commitment of the gravely disabled mentally ill. The California
Supreme Court's first decision in the case of Conservatorship of Roulet
14
indicated that, at least in California, due process for the gravely dis-
abled was satisfied by clear and convincing evidence of disability and a
jury vote.' 5 Chief Justice Bird's dissent called for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict.' 6 This note will ex-
amine the history of the treatment of gravely disabled persons which
underlies Chief Justice Bird's initial dissent and subsequent majority
the ability to maintain an even temper, an alert intelligence, socially considerate behavior,
and a happy disposition. This, I think, is a healthy mind." Redlich & Freedman, The Prob-
lem of Normality, in READINGS IN LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 56 (1968) (quoting Karl Men-
ninger) [hereinafter cited as READINGS].
6. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5368 (West 1972).
7. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h) (West Supp. 1979) defines gravely disabled as
a "condition in which a person, as a result of mental disorder, is unable to provide for his
basic personal needs for food, clothing, or shelter." See text accompanying note 6 supra.
8. Id. § 5275.
9. Id. § 5350(d).
10. Id. § 5150.
11. Id. § 5250.
12. Id. § 5300.
13. Id. §§ 5350, 5352.1, 5355.
14. 20 Cal. 3d 653, 574 P.2d 1245, 143 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1978), rev'don rehearing, 23 Cal.
3d 219, 590 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1979) (The opinion was deleted from Cal. 3d when
rehearing granted, and subsequent footnotes will only cite P.2d and Cal. Rptr. for this Case.)
15. Id., 574 P.2d at 1249-50, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 897-98.
16. Id. at 1260, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 908 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
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opinion on rehearing. It will attempt to demonstrate that her stricter
standards are in the best interests of both society and the individual.
The note begins with a general discussion of the history and theory
behind the civil commitment process in this country. It will acquaint
the reader with the current procedures for civil commitment and the
way in which those procedures are viewed by the legal and medical
professions. The second section is a synopsis of the LPS Act, with em-
phasis on the involuntary civil commitment requirements and the pow-
ers granted to a conservator. The third section contains a discussion of
procedural and substantive due process. The note continues by tracing
the relevant case law prior to the initial Roulet decision which deals
with standard of proof and a discussion of the two Roulet decisions.
Next the authors address the points raised in the initial Roulet majority
opinion, and conclude with a discussion on the recent decision handed
down on rehearing by the California Supreme Court, in which Chief
Justice Bird's earlier position prevailed to emerge as the new law in
California.
I. Civil Commitment
Civil commitment is a twentieth century chimera. It has legal,
medical, moral and ethical portions. Each person, when looking at the
beast, will see something different. In 1858, one author commenting on
his country's civil commitment system said, "in no country in the world
could similarly well-ordered provisions for the maintenance and recov-
ery of the poor insane be found. . . ... " Other writers report that the
hospitals were overcrowded, with squalid conditions resembling a jail
or almshouse."8 Most contemporary scholars focus on the dramatic
changes which have occurred in the civil commitment system. They
note the better living conditions, more educated staff and more scien-
tific methods of treating the mentally ill.19
The existence of mental illness was recognized as early as 1500
B.C.,20 yet the causes remain a mystery. Theories ranged from posses-
sion by evil spirits to imbalances of the brain.2' Treatment was also
17. Insane Colony ofGheel, 4 ASYLUM J. MENTAL SCIENCE 427 (Apr. 1858).
18. Bassuk & Gerson, Deinstitutionalization and Mental Health Services, 238 SCIENTIFIC
AMERICAN, 46, 47 (1978).
19. See generally J. Zusman, Conservatorship and Guardianship: A Medical Perspec-
tive (1978) (unpublished paper prepared for the 1978 Regional Institutes in Law and Mental
Health, USC Schools of Medicine and Public Administration) [hereinafter cited as Zusman,
1978 unpublished paper]. See also S. Pollack, Commitment of the Mentally I1 (1978) (un-
published paper prepared for the 1978 Regional Institutes in Law and Mental Health, USC
Schools of Medicine and Public Administration) [hereinafter Pollack, 1978 unpublished pa-
per].
20. Overholser, An Historical Sketch of Psychiatry, in READINGS, supra note 5, at 3.
21. Id.
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erratic, ranging from blood letting to music, and from burning at the
stake to hospitalization.22 It was not until the mid-17th century that
scientific thought began to outweigh the superstitious dogmatism of the
Catholic Church which had dominated the Middle Ages. By the mid-
1700's, several advanced philosophers and a few organically-oriented
physicians had begun to write on the classifications and explanations of
mental illness.23
There are two bases of the state's power to commit an individual
to a mental health facility: parenspatriae and the police power. In
early England, the King was responsible for the care of the mentally ill.
Acting in the setting of a paternalistic ruler, the King was said to have
the power, indeed the duty, ofparenspatriae.24 In the United States,
theparenspatriae power was exercised by the state legislatures rather
than the King.25 It was exercised on behalf of the mentally ill individ-
ual considered incapable of making competent decisions regarding his
own mental state or his need for mental health care.26 Police power is
the authority of the state to protect itself against breaches of the
peace.27 It is invoked in the area of civil commitment if a person is
determined to be dangerous to others.28 The state then assumes the
power to protect its citizens from the dangerous person by removing
him from the mainstream of society.
A. Civil Commitment in California
The civil commitment process in California usually begins when a
person is brought to a mental health facility by family members,
friends or the police.29 The person is given a short interview with a
psychiatrist, social worker or other mental health professional. The ob-
ject of this initial interview is to determine whether the person was tem-
22. Id. at 3-4.
23. For a complete discussion of this history, see Overholser, An Historical Sketch of
Psychiatry, in READINGS, supra note 5, at 3.
24. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 257 (1972) (quoting 3 W. BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES 47).
25. Id.
26. Note, Developments in the Law. Civil Commitment of the Mentally Iii, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1190 (1974).
27. MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 83 (July-Aug. 1977). See also note 3 supra.
28. A discussion of this area of the law is beyond the scope of this note. However, many
civil commitment cases stem from cases relating to the criminal record of the individual, and
a finding that one is "dangerous to others" may be considered in that respect. For discussion
of civil commitment under the "dangerous to others" statutes of the LPS Act, see D. Her-
man, Preventative Detention, A Scientyfc View ofMan, and State Power, 2 U. ILL. L. F. 673
(1973), and Comment, 4 Dangerous Commitment, 2 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 117 (1974).
29. Report of the State Bar of California's Commission on Law and Mental Health
Problems, Committee on California Mental Health Services Act 33 (Jan. 1979) [hereinafter
cited as Committee Report].
porarily upset or distressed or instead has a problem which requires
mental health care." The person is ordinarily asked to describe his
own behavior and give the reasons for it. If he appears overly anxious
or upset, or in any other way in need of mental health care, he will be
detained in the facility for an initial observation period. This decision
to detain or release marks the beginning of the civil commitment proc-
ess. The entire process may involve emergency detention, temporary
detention, indefinite commitment, outpatient care or a conservatorship.
It may be as short as 72 hours3 ' or it may extend over the life of the
individual.3"
The most common rationale for civil commitment is the determi-
nation that a person is unable to care for himself in society: he cannot
provide his own shelter, clothing or food.33 Generally this person will
be placed under the supervision of a "conservator," a person (family,
friend, or state employee) who is responsible for aiding him in his
everyday needs, much like a guardian.3 4 Conservatorship was first en-
visioned as a kind of supervision for mentally impaired people who
only needed some assistance to survive, rather than detention and com-
plete surveillance. 5
The civil commitment statutes of most states now look strikingly
different from those of 10 or 20 years ago 6.3  Today's process of civil
commitment contains more legal safeguards and fewer strictly medical
30. Id. at 12-13.
31. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1972).
32. See Note, Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill in Calffornia." The Lanterman-Petris-
Short Act, 7 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 93, 121-22 (1974). Under the LPS Act, once a person is
placed in a mental health facility there are certain minimum standards which must be ob-
served throughout his commitment. Some of these are periodic review of his condition,
periodic reevaluation of the treatment program and the right to consult a staff psychiatrist.
However, until recently most mentally ill people did not know that there were ways out of
the mental health system. Mental health ombudsmen and attorneys specializing in the field,
as well as cooperative legal organizations, have discovered cases of people who have been in
a mental health facility for 25 to 50 years. Furthermore, mental health detention is a
debilitating experience. After a period of time even the most "well" person may begin to
depend upon medication, forget how to perform the normal functions of a healthy person
and in fact become a mentally disabled person. These people may well be doomed to a life
of dependence and mental health care detention.
33. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h) (West 1972).
34. A "guardian," as opposed to a "conservator," is utilized most often in the case of
minor children. While most practitioners in the field of mental health use the two terms
interchangeably, the general feeling is that guardianship implies legal incompetency while
conservatorship under the LPS Act implies an actual medical disability caused by mental
illness. Further, conservatorship lends itself to potential restoration of independent func-
tioning capabilities, whereas guardianship, in spite of its extensive use for minor children,
implies a degenerative condition, such as senile dementia, from which the individual will not
recover.
35. Committee Report, supra note 29, at 3.
36. See A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION (1975).
Summer 19791 CONSERVATORSHIP OF ROULET
1066 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 6:1061
decisions.37 Mental illness is becoming more a legal standard and less
a medical diagnosis.38 The system also looks different from the per-
spectives of the mental health and legal professionals. The mental
health professional envisions the civil commitment process as a method
of aiding the mentally impaired person who may not recognize his own
need for mental health care.39 The legal professional may see civil
commitment as the end of social control in the form of preventive de-
tention in which the patient is incarcerated rather than hospitalized.40
Some legal professionals assert that the mental health professional
has no regard for the patient's competence to make decisions or his
ability to be helped by the mental health care system.4' In response,
some mental health professionals claim that the legal professional has
no regard for the patient's need for mental health care or the possibility
that such care may permanently "cure" the patient and allow him to
live successfully in society.42 Civil commitment under the LPS Act is
an attempt to balance these concerns. It is an effort to allow the mental
health professional to make mental health care decisions while inter-
jecting the legal process to protect personal liberties.43 The next section
of this note analyzes this statutory response to the problem of civil
commitment of the mentally ill.
B. Overview of the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act
Before the enactment of the LPS Act, the law governing involun-
tary civil commitment was contained in California Welfare and Institu-
tions Code sections 5559 and 55 67 . 4 These sections provided that a
person could be committed involuntarily on grounds of mental illness
if his mental state was such that he was in need of supervision, treat-
ment, care or restraint and/or dangerous to himself or to the person or
37. See generally J. Ellis, Constitutional Issues in Civil Commitment: An Attempt to
Answer the Current Backlash (1978) (unpublished paper for the 1978 Regional Institutes in
Law and Mental Health, USC Schools of Medicine and Public Administration).
38. Id.
39. Schwartz, SocialAmbivalence Over Involuntary Treatment, 16 PSYCHIATRIC OPIN-
ION 25 (April 1979).
40. Pollack, 1978 unpublished paper, supra note 19, at 6.
41. Id. at 6-7; Zusman, 1978 unpublished paper, supra note 19, at 22.
42. See Thorn v. Superior Court, I Cal. 3d 666, 673-74; 464 P.2d 56, 61; 83 Cal. Rptr.
600, 605, where the court stated: "The Subcommittee Report, supra, at pages 6-7, notes that
a review of recent legislative actions throughout the nation with respect to mental health
services 'illustrates the tendency to make the process either more medical, as in New York,
or to increase legal protections, as in the District of Columbia. This has tended to place state
legislatures in the uncomfortable position of having to choose between the medical objec-
tives of treating sick people without delays and the equally valid legal aim of insuring that
persons are not deprived of their liberties without due process of law.' (Footnotes omitted.)"
43. Pollack, 1978 unpublished paper, supra note 19, at 6-7.
44. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5559, 5567 (West 1966).
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property of others and in need of supervision, treatment, care or re-
straint. If a person was found to meet one of the above criteria and was
committed, he lost: (1) the right to refuse medical or psychiatric treat-
ment;45 (2) the right to own or possess firearms;46 (3) the right to vote;47
and (4) the right to engage in property transactions where a title search
was required, because the title insurance companies refused to insure
anyone who had been committed.48 If a person practiced a profession
such as law, medicine, accounting, psychology or nursing, the respec-
tive licensing boards would automatically suspend his license upon in-
voluntary commitment.49 The Department of Motor Vehicles, in its
discretion, could revoke a drivers license or refuse to renew an expired
one.5 0 A public official lost his office if civilly committed .5  In addition
to these specific deprivations, a stigma attached to someone who had
been involuntarily committed in other numerous and varied aspects of
his life. 2
The LPS Act was enacted in 1967,11 due in large part to the effects
of involuntary commitment, plus the desire for local, rather than state
care.' The Act was intended to establish new procedures for the civil
commitment of the mentally ill and to safeguard their legal rights after
commitment.5 5 A California appellate court recently reiterated this po-
45. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1966).
46. See Note, The Needfor Reform in the California Civil Commitment Procedure, 19
STAN. L. REV. 992 n.3 (1967).
47. Id. at 992 n.4.
48. Id. at 993 n.7.
49. CAL. ASSEMBLY COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, SUBCOMM. ON MENTAL HEALTH
SERVICES, THE DILEMMA OF MENTAL COMMITMENTS IN CALIFORNIA-A BACKGROUND
DOCUMENT 189-90 (1966) [hereinafter cited as BACKGROUND DOCUMENT].
50. See CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 12805 (West Supp. 1966), 13359 (West 1960).
51. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 1770(b) (West 1966).
52. See BACKGROUND DOCUMENT, supra note 49, at 59-60. For a more complete dis-
cussion, see Conservatorship of Roulet, 23 Cal. 3d 219, 590 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1979);
In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 569 P.2d 1286, 141 Cal. Rptr. 298 (1977).
53. The LPS Act was amended by 1968 Cal. Stats., ch. 1374, § 13, prior to its effective
date of July 1, 1969. The LPS Act has served as a model for other state legislation, e.g.,
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 71.05.010-.920 (1975), which became effective on January 1,
1974. Wash. Rev. Code § 71.05.930 (1975).
54. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358 (West 1972) provides in part: "If the conservatee
is not to be placed in his own home or the home of a relative, first priority shall be to
placement in a suitable facility as close as possible to his home or the home of a relative."
55. See, e.g., Thorn v. Superior Court, I Cal. 3d 666, 668, 464 P.2d 56, 57, 83 Cal. Rptr.
600, 601 (1970), where the court stated: "The LPS act, as enacted in 1967 after a two-year
legislative study, and thereafter amended, repealed the principal provisions for the civil
commitment of mentally ill persons found in prior California law and replaced them by a
new statutory scheme repealing the indeterminate commitment, removing the legal disabili-
ties previously imposed upon persons adjudicated to be mentally ill, and enacting an exten-
sive scheme of community-based services, emphasizing voluntary treatment and providing
for periods of involuntary observation and crises treatment for persons who are unable to
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sition when it wrote that the LPS Act was "designed to provide prompt,
short-term, community-based intensive treatment, without stigma or
loss of liberty, to individuals with mental disorders."56 The following
sections examine specific provisions of the LPS Act.
L Gravely Disabled
While California Welfare and Institutions Code section 5008 pro-
vides a statutory definition of "gravely disabled",57 the term has led to
much confusion within the judicial system. Section 5008(h) defines
"gravely disabled" as a "condition in which a person, as a result of
mental disorder or impairment by chronic alcoholism, is unable to pro-
vide for his basic personal needs for food, clothing or shelter."5" Since
its inception, this legislatively created definition has precipitated nu-
merous difficulties, both judicially and medically, in measuring "basic
personal needs."59 Thus, it has become apparent that a more accurate
and reliable standard is required. In response, many state courts have
adopted functional or operational definitions. They are not identical in
all respects, but strong similarities are evident. Some of the relevant
questions include: "Is the person making it in the community or do
they repeatedly require hospitalization? Are they taking medication?
Do they get their welfare checks and do they eat the check or do they
spend it appropriately? Do they go out and buy alcohol the first
day?"
60
In a recent study focusing on this problem in California,6 1 Carol
care for themselves or whose condition makes them a danger to themselves or others." See
also CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5001 (West 1977) (legislative intent of the LPS Act); A.
STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 60 (1976).
56. Conservatorship of Chambers, 71 Cal. App. 3d 277, 282, 139 Cal. Rptr. 357, 362
(1977) (footnote omitted). But see People v. Thomas, 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 594 (1977); People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975);
People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975). These three cases
held that commitment does entail stigma and loss of liberty equal to that of criminal incar-
ceration.
57. All statutory references are to the California Welfare and Institutions Code unless
otherwise stated.
58. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5008(h) (West 1978).
59. The reason that more cases do not address this problem is that most decisions in this
area of the law are not appealed beyond the trial court level.
60. A Review of California's Programs/or the Mentally Disabled- Public Hearings on
House Resolution 106 Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Mental Health and Develop-
mental Disabilities 231-32 (Nov. 4, 1977) (Teknekron, Inc.) [hereinafter cited as November
Teknekron Report]. Dr. Selwyn Rose, from whose testimony this excerpt is quoted, was
Senior Consultant and Associate to Teknekron Corp. which contracted to do the study for
the State Assembly Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Subcommittee. Dr. Rose
is a psychiatrist and an attorney who has long been involved in hospital administration and
court proceedings involving the LPS Act.
6 1. Warren, Involuntary Commitmentfor Mental Disorder: The Application of Calfor-
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A.B. Warren sat in on the civil commitment hearings of 100 persons
who had filed writs of habeas corpus after being detained for 72
hours.62 Warren discovered that despite the strict statutory definition
of "gravely disabled," the California courts employed certain opera-
tional factors of their own: (1) prior hospitalization; (2) refusal of med-
ication; (3) denial of illness; (4) cooperation in the hospital during the
72 hour hold; (5) concurrent conservatorship proceedings; (6) family's
willingness to care for the individual; (7) ability to provide food, cloth-
ing and shelter; (8) residual deviance (violation of norms); and (9)
financial and employment status.63 Relatively few of these factors re-
late either directly or indirectly to the strict statutory standards of sec-
tion 5008(h). The courts' use of these additional criteria points out that
they are finding the statutory criteria inadequate to enable them to
make objective judgments regarding potential commitments.
In addition to the definitional problems with the term "gravely dis-
abled," there is also a timing problem. The law is unclear as to whether
the patient must meet the legal requirement of "gravely disabled"
before or after hospitalization.64 Many courts interpret "gravely dis-
abled" as referring to a person's mental status on the day of his court
65appearance. Other courts interpret the term as referring to a person's
ability to provide for food, clothing and shelter in his everyday life.
66
Though seemingly unimportant, this may be a crucial difference since
on the day of a person's court appearance he may have been under
institutional care for over two weeks 67 and thus may be in better condi-
tion than he would have been in if left to fend for himself. Persons
under institutional care generally have been well fed, are clothed and
are usually in better physical condition.68  Despite those factors, the
California Court of Appeal held in Conservatorshiv of Chambers69 that
the term "gravely disabled" is not unconstitutionally vague and over-
nia's Lanterman-Petris-Short.4ct, 11 L. & Soc'y REv. 629 (1977) [hereinafter cited as War-
ren].
62. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5252.1 (West 1978). Section 5252.1 provides that the
copy of the notice of certification required to be delivered to all patients before involuntary
14-day intensive treatment, id. § 5252, must inform a person of his right to judicial review by
habeas corpus. See text accompanying note 8 supra.
63. Warren, supra note 61, at 633-38.
64. ENKI RESEARCH INSTITUTE, A STUDY OF CALIFORNIA'S NEW MENTAL HEALTH
LAW 157 (1969-1971).
65. California Assembly Permanent Subcommittee on Mental Health and Developmental
Disabilities.- Improving Calf/ornia's Mental Health System 42 (Sept. 30, 1977) (Teknekron,
Inc.) [hereinafter cited as September Teknekron Report]. See also November Teknekron
Report, supra note 60, at 232-35.
66. September Teknekron Report, supra note 65, at 42.
67. This includes the 72-hour hold period plus the 14-day intensive treatment period.
68. November Teknekron Report, supra note 60, at 232.
69. 71 Cal. App. 3d 277, 139 Cal. Rptr. 357 (1977).
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broad.7" In so holding, the court stated that
The term "gravely disabled" is sufficiently precise to exclude un-
usual or nonconformist lifestyles. It connotes an inability or re-
fusal on the part of the proposed conservatee to care for basic
personal needs of food, clothing and shelter. It also provides fair
notice of the proscribed conduct to the proposed conservatee who
must be presumed to be a person of common intelligence for the
purpose of determining the sufficiency of the statute.7"
The Chambers court never considered the question of when to ap-
ply the statutory definition, but due to Chambers' long history of
mental disorder72 it is doubtful that this factor would have influenced
the court's decision. The court's primary concern was comparing the
safeguards available in "grave disability" proceedings with those in
"dangerousness" proceedings. Thus, the court seemed unconcerned
with whether Chambers could care for himself before, during or after
hospitalization. In addition, the court was only addressing the narrow
issue raised by Chambers: that the standard for "grave disability" pur-
ports to provide for the incarceration of individuals who have not com-
mitted an overt act demonstrating dangerousness to themselves or to
others.73
70. Id Cf. In the Matter of Gary Seefeld, No. 454-225 (Wis. Cir. CL Milwaukee County
Oct. 31, 1977) (as commented on in 2 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 363 (Jan.-Feb. 1978)),
(Wisconsin's statute permitting civil commitment of a person with impaired judgment was
held unconstitutionally vague and a denial of substantive due process). It must be noted
that Wisconsin's definition of a person who, due to impaired judgment, manifested a very
substantial probability of injury to himself or herself was unlike California's definition of
gravely disabled, even though substantially similar. It read: "Every written petition for
examination shall allege that the subject individual to be examined: Is mentally in, drug
dependent, or developmentally disabled and is a proper subject for treatment; and
[E]vidences such impaired judgment, manifested by evidence of a pattern of recent acts or
admissions, that there is a very substantial probability of physical impairment or injury to
himself or herself. The probability of physical impairment or injury may not be deemed
very substantial under this subparagraph if reasonable provision for the subject individual's
protection is available in the community or if the individual is appropriate for placement
under § 55.06." Wis. STAT. ANN. § 51.20(l)(a)(2)(c) (West 1976).
71. 71 Cal. App. 3d at 284, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 362.
72. Chambers had first been admitted to Napa State Hospital on January 23, 1973 at
the age of 21. Prior to this he had begun drinking heavily at the age of 15 and had been
arrested numerous times for drunkenness as an adult. He had also taken LSD 35 times and
had ingested mescaline, marijuana, methedrine and heroin. Due to his drug habits he was
subject to bizarre and violent behavior. Before this proceeding, Chambers had been admit-
ted to Napa State Hospital six times. The last admission was the result of a physical attack
upon his mother, precipitated when she flushed his prescribed medications down the toilet
for his own good. Id. at 280-81, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 359-60.
73. Id. at 281, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 360.
2 Procedure for detention and commitment ofpersons adjudged to be
"gravely disabled"
Conservatorship proceedings are initiated by application from any
individual who alleges that a person's condition should be evaluated
due to grave disability.74 A peace officer or other professional person
designated by the county may, if he has "reasonable cause," take that
person into custody and place him in a facility for a 72 hour evaluation
period. 5 Since the 72 hour detention period is of a relatively short
duration, and because it serves to protect against imminent danger to
people confined for evaluation, it was deemed not in violation of an
individual's due process rights by the legislators who enacted the LPS
Act.76 However, "reasonable cause" as required by the Act is never
defined within the Act itself. Thus, a person could theoretically be de-
tained for 72 hours for no other reason than a neighbor's grudge or
because another person considered his behavior unusual.
If a person is found to be gravely disabled or dangerous to himself
or others after the initial 72 hours have elapsed, he may be certified for
an additional 14 days of involuntary treatment.77 This period may be
shorter, however, if the person is willing to accept voluntary treat-
ment.78 At the time a person receives a notice of certification for inten-
sive treatment, he has the right to counsel and to a habeas corpus
hearing to obtain his release.79 Within two days after this petition is
filed, the superior court must grant the writ or order an evidentiary
hearing. 0 The court will immediately release the petitioner if: (1) he is
not gravely disabled; (2) he has not been advised of or has accepted
voluntary treatment; or (3) the facility is incapable of providing the
mandated treatment.8 If a person is still thought to be gravely dis-
abled after 17 days,82 then the mental health professional in charge of
the facility providing care for the 17 day period can recommend con-
servatorship to the county officer in charge of conservatorship investi-
74. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5201 (West 1978).
75. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West 1978) provides for emergency detention by
any peace officer or designated county official. Section 5201 of the same code provides for
the filing of a petition by a private person requesting an evaluation of an individual. Both of
these procedures are used to initiate the 72-hour holding period.
76. While the constitutionality of the 72-hour hold period has never been successfully
attacked, there are some who believe that more due process safeguards are mandated during
this period. See Comment, Compulsory Counselfor Calfornia's New Mental Health Law, 17
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 851 (1970) (advocates appointment of counsel, as distinguished from the
right to counsel, during the initial 72 hour hold period).
77. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5250 (West 1978).
78. Id. § 5254.
79. Id. § 5275.
80. Id. § 5276.
81. Id.
82. This is the 72-hour period plus the 14-day period.
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gation. 3 If the officer concurs with this judgment after investigating all
of the possible alternatives,84 he will petition the superior court to es-
tablish conservatorship pursuant to California Probate Code section
1754.85 At this stage in the proceedings, either a temporary conservator
will be appointed for a period not to exceed 30 days,86 or a permanent
conservator will be assigned.87 If the latter is assigned, the conservator-
ship will automatically terminate after one year.88 At the end of the
one year period the conservator may petition the court to re-establish
the conservatorship for another one year period.8 9 The petition must
include the opinions of two physicians that the conservatee is still
"gravely disabled."9 In addition, the conservatee may request a re-
hearing on the issue of his "grave disability" every six months.9 In all
of these hearings and rehearings, the conservatee is entitled to a jury
trial if he so elects.
92
3. Conservator's Powers under the LPS Act
While there are no uniform powers awarded to all conservators,
there are certain powers granted to give conservators minimum rights
over their conservatees. The governing provisions of the LPS Act in
this area are sections 5357 and 5358. Section 5357 confers upon the
conservator the general administrative powers specified in Probate
Code section 1852,93 as well as the additional powers specified in Pro-
83. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352 (West 1978).
84. Id. § 5354.
85. Id. § 5352. One important difference between the habeas corpus hearing and the
conservatorship hearing is that the subject need not be present at the conservatorship hear-
ing. Section 5352 states that a petition for a conservatorship hearing shall be filed as set
forth in CAL. PROB. CODE § 1754. This section states that while the "proposed conservatee
shall have the right to appear at such hearing and oppose such petition" he may be excused
"if not able to attend by reason of medical inability ... " CAL. PROB. CODE § 1754 (West
Supp. 1978).
86. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5352.1 (West 1978).
87. Id. § 5355.
88. Id. § 5361.
89. Id.
90. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5361 (West 1978) provides: "In the event that the
conservator is unable to obtain the opinion of two physicians, he shall request that the court
appoint them."
91. Id. § 5364.
92. Id. § 5350(d).
93. This section gives a guardian or conservator all of the powers in Chapters 7, 8 and 9
of Division 4 of the CAL. PROB. CODE §§ 1500-61. These include: payment of debts owed
by and collection of monies owed to the conservatee, § 1501; management of the con-
servatee's estate as well as the application of income to the support of the conservatee and
his family, §§ 1502, 1530; commencement and prosectuion of actions for partition of the
conservatee's property, as well as execution of deeds of conveyance to the remaining owners
of the land, §§ 1506-1508; deposit or withdrawal of the conservatee's money or assets in a
bank or a trust company, respectively, §§ 1513, 1514; dedication of the conservatee's prop-
bate Code section 1853.94 Furthermore, section 5357 allows the court
the collateral power to rule on the proposed conservatee's rights to: (1)
possess a driver's license; (2) enter into contracts; (3) refuse or consent
to treatment related to the conservatee's grave disability; and (4) refuse
or consent to other medical treatment.95 Section 5358 allows the con-
servator the power, if specified in the order, to hospitalize his con-
servatee and order treatment related to his grave disability.96
The court in its discretion may grant all or some of the above pow-
ers. Were a conservator granted all of these powers, he would have full
control over his conservatee's private, social, and professional life. Be-
cause of the potential scope of a conservator's powers, civil commit-
ment under the LPS Act implicates the individual's due process rights
to liberty and property. The next section of this note will examine the
nature and extent of these constitutional rights.
II. Due Process
A. Substantive Due Process
In general, if government seeks to propound a law which either
deprives a person of "fundamental rights" or employs a suspect classifi-
cation, it must show that the law is necessary to promote a compelling
erty to the state, § 1515; the giving of powers of proxies to vote shares of the conservatee's
corporate stock, § 1517; and the borrowing of money when it will benefit the conservatee,
§ 1533.
94. These powers are as follows: "To institute and maintain all actions and other pro-
ceedings for the benefit of and to defend all actions and other proceedings against the con-
servatee or the conservatorship estate; to take, collect and hold the property of the
conservatee; to contract for the conservatorship and to perform outstanding contracts and
thereby bind the conservatorship estate; to operate at the risk of the estate any business, farm
or enterprise constituting an asset of the conservatorship, to grant and take options to sell at
public or private sale; to create by grant or otherwise easements and servitudes; to borrow
money and give security for the repayment thereof; to purchase real or personal property; to
alter, improve and repair or raze, replace and rebuild conservatorship property; to let or
lease property for any purpose including exploration for and removal of gas, oil and other
minerals and natural resources and for any period, including a term commencing at a future
time; to loan money on adequate security; to exchange conservatorship property; to sell on
credit provided that any unpaid portion of the selling price shall be adequately secured; to
vote in person or by proxy all shares and securities held by the conservator, to exercise stock
rights and stock options; to participate in and become subject and to consent to the provi-
sions of any voting trust and of any reorganization, consolidation, merger, dissolution, liqui-
dation or other modification or adjustment affecting conservatorship property; to effect
necessary insurance for the proper protection of the estate, to pay, collect, compromise, arbi-
trate, or otherwise adjust any and all claims, debts, or demands upon the conservatorship,
including those for taxes; to abandon valueless property, and to employ attorneys, account-
ants, investment counsel, agents, depositaries and employees and to pay the expense therefor
from the conservatorship estate." CAL. PROB. CODE § 1853 (West Supp. 1979).
95. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5357 (a), (b), (c), (e) (West Supp. 1978).
96. Id. § 5358.
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or overriding state interest.97 If rights are not impaired or if no suspect
classification is employed, then the law need only be rationally related
to a legitimate government end.98
Within a civil commitment or conservatorship context, substantive
due process analysis would require that two determinations be made:
first, whether the law authorizing commitment or conservatorship im-
pinges on an individual's fundamental rights so that strict scrutiny is
necessary; and second, whether the state can meet the burden of show-
ing a compelling state interest.99
Before it can be determined whether fundamental rights are in-
volved, that term must be defined. Basically, fundamental rights are
rights which the United States Supreme Court recognizes as essential to
individual liberty. The Court has determined these to include: First
Amendment rights of freedom of speech and religion" the right to
engage in interstate travel; I1 ' the right to vote;10 2 the right to fair pro-
ceedings prior to a deprivation of personal property; 10 3 the right of as-
97. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (race as a suspect classification); Takahasi
v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (alienage as a suspect classification). For
recognized fundamental interests, see Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (interstate
travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (voting); Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12 (1956) (procedural rights of criminal defendants) and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316
U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation). Nonetheless, the concept of fundamental rights has yet to be
defined with exactness. The common theme of cases finding a fundamental right is a severe
detriment imposed on the complaining party. See Developments in the Law-Equal Protec-
tion, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1130 (1969); see generally J. NOWAK. R. ROTUNDA & J.
YoUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 416-19 (1978).
98. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897), was one of the first cases where the
Court expounded its rational relation test, even though it was only in dicta. In Nebbia v.
New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), which involved a state minimum price law for milk, the
Court held that if the law has a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, the
requirements of due process are satisfied. This was the first in a series of cases in which the
Court adopted a deferential attitude toward state economic regulatory legislation. See also
Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972), where the Court observed that, "[a]t the least, due
process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some reasonable relation
to the purpose for which the individual is committed." Id. at 738.
99. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (Court invalidated a statute restrict-
ing welfare payments to residents of the state of more than one year); Skinner v. Oklahoma,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (constitutional challenge to the Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Steriliza-
tion Act). See generalo L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16-6 to 16-8 (1978).
100. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1946); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252
(1941).
101. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745
(1966). See also Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958) for important dictum on the right to
travel.
102. Hill v. Stone, 421 U.S. 289 (1975); Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970);
Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621
(1969).
103. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
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sociation;' ° the right of privacy including the rights of free choice in
abortion"0 5 and birth control; 06 and the right to freedom of choice in
marriage. 0 7
An individual facing a civil commitment or conservatorship hear-
ing is in danger of losing certain of these fundamental rights, including
the right to vote, 0 8 as well as the right to personal property'0 9 and lib-
erty. 10 The individual may also lose his right to contract"' and his
right to a drivers license." 2
Since commitment and conservatorship hearings do affect funda-
mental rights, it should be determined whether a compelling state inter-
est justifies the existence of the laws authorizing these processes. In
general, the commitment and conservatorship processes serve to further
dual state interests: the first being the state's interest in the individual's
welfare; and the second being the state's interest in the safety of soci-
ety.
13
The concern for individual welfare is typified in this language
from a 1965 competency hearing: "[t]he alleged incompetent is suffer-
ing from a mental illness to such an extent that he is incapable of caring
for himself, or managing his property or is likely to dissipate or lose his
property or become the victim of designing persons."" 14 Should a men-
tally ill person enter into a contract with another party, this last state-
ment takes on particular significance. It is in society's interest to
assume the responsibility of protecting the incompetent person from
overreaching by the competent contracting party." 5
104. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
105. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
106. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). This case established a constitutional
right of privacy based on the penumbras of various guarantees contained in the Bill of
Rights. The Court concluded that the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amendments all pro-
tected privacy in various forms, and that in combination these amendments extend beyond
their specific terms and create "zones of privacy" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
against state invasion.
107. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
108. CALIF. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5357 (West Supp. 1979).
109. Id. § 5353. This is a qualified loss of personal property subject to court approval.
110. Id. § 5358.
111. Id. § 5357.
112. Id.
113. See note 3 supra.
114. In re Pickles' Petition, 170 So.2d 603, 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965).
115. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 231, 233, 234 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7,
1973). See also Alexander & Szasz, From Contract to Status via Psychiatry, 13 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 537. In this article the authors conclude: "In short, we favor doing away with
the legal recognition of mental incompetency as a ground of avoiding contracts.. . because
we believe that this policy is most consistent with the traditional moral aims of Anglo-Saxon
law, and especially contract law-namely, the expansion of the scope of individual self-
determination and the protection of personal dignity; and because we cherish and support
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The concern for society's safety exists because of potential conse-
quences which could result if a mentally ill person is left to mingle in
the mainstream of society. For example, in a contractual setting, it may
not be the competent party who overreaches, but rather, the competent
party may instead rely to his detriment upon the contract." 6 More-
over, there also exists the danger of actual physical harm to another
person if an incompetent person is permitted to drive an automobile.
Societal concerns such as these must be weighed against the detri-
ment to the individual who is labeled "mentally ill." Even if the state's
interests are seen as compelling, thereby justifying commitment and
conservatorship processes, the individual's interest may still be pro-
tected to a certain extent by various procedural due process guarantees.
The remainder of this Note will discuss these due process safeguards.
B. Procedural Due Process
The Fourteenth Amendment provides that no state may deprive
an individual of life, liberty, or property without first affording him due
process of law."17 Procedural due process is required, only when the
impaired interest is either a life, liberty or property interest falling
under Fourteenth Amendment protection.
The United States Supreme Court has failed to define either "lib-
erty" or "property" with exactness." 8 We do know, however, that the
term "liberty" is not merely confined to its more common connotation
of freedom from bodily restraint." 9 The Court has included within its
meaning the right to contract and the right to engage in gainful em-
ployment, among other rights. 2 ° "Property" is not limited to owner-
ship of tangibles. It encompasses one's legitimate expectations of
entitlement to various benefits under state or federal law.' Included
these values and rank them, on our own scale, higher than security or 'mental health."' Id.
at 559.
116. Dexter v. Hall, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 9 (1872).
117. "No state shall . . .deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law...." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I.
118. Far from being an omission, the Court instead has seen the evoluation of these
terms as an aging process. This is illustrated by the Court's statement that: "'Liberty' and
'property' are broad and majestic terms. They are among the '[g]reat [constitutional] con-
cepts. . . purposely left to gather meaning from experience. . . . [T]hev relate to the whole
domain of social and economic fact, and the statesmen who founded this Nation knew too
well that only a stagnant society remains unchanged."' Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 571 (1972) (quoting National Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Co., 337 U.S. 582, 646 (1949)
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
119. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
120. See generally Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405,
411-16 (1977). See also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), and Warren, The New
"Liberty" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 HARV. L. Rnv. 431, 439 (1926).
121. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972). This case established the view of
among these benefits are the right to public education,122 welfare, 23 a
drivers license, 24 and other statutory rights. 25 Since a person facing a
civil commitment or conservatorship hearing is in danger of losing his
liberty and property rights, 26 presumably procedural due process safe-
guards are necessary parts of these processes.
In general, the United States Supreme Court has leaned toward a
utilitarian view in determining what procedures due process may re-
quire under any given circumstance. 127 Essentially, the Court balances
te cost of the safeguards to society against their worth to the individ-
ual. 28 Conversely, the detriment to the individual must be weighed
against the benefit to society.
129
Specifically, the Court has found that due process requires in vary-
ing degrees, the following safeguards for the individual: (1) adequate
notice of the charges or reasons for the governmental action; 30 (2) an
opportunity to be heard; 13 (3) the right to confront witnesses or evi-
dence;' 32 (4) the right to counsel;' 33 and (5) the right to a decision based
on the record. 34 In criminal matters, additional safeguards are im-
posed: (1) the right to compulsory process to ensure the presence of
property as an "entitlement." The Court will recognize a property interest in government
benefits only if it can be determined that the person is entitled to them.
122. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975). The Supreme Court held that public high
school students could not be suspended without a hearing since the students had a legitimate
entitlement to a public education as a property interest.
123. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
124. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971).
125. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262.
126. See notes 108-112 supra.
127. See generally Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Adminstrative
Adjudication in Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U.
CHI. L. REv. 28, 46-49 (1976) (hereinafter cited as Mashaw), where the author discusses the
utility theory used in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Mathews states that due
process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: first, the private interest
that will be affected by the official action, second, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
such interest through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or
substitute procedural safeguards, and finally, the government's interest. See also Cafeteria
& Restaurant Workers Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961), where Justice Stew-
art stated that two factors must be considered in due process cases: "the precise nature of the
government function involved. . . [and] the private interest that has been affected by gov-
ernmental action.", and Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 330 (1945), where the
Court per Justice Douglas, stated that the right to a hearing "becomes an empty thing"
unless all parties affected by the proceeding have an equal opportunity to be heard.
128. Mashaw supra note 127 at 46-49.
129. Id.
130. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
131. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
132. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
133. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
134. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 271.
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witnesses;' 35 (2) the right to a public hearing; 3 6 (3) the right to a tran-
script of the proceedings for appellate review; 37 and (4) the right to a
jury trial.
138
In the context of civil commitment, it was not until 1972, in the
case of Lessard v. Schmidt, 39 that substantial due process considera-
tions were recognized for the mentally ill. In that case, a three-judge
district court held that a person could be detained provided there was
probable cause to believe that he was in need of mental health care.
The court cautioned, however, that he had to be brought before a mag-
istrate as soon as possible, and no later than 48 hours after his initial
detention. 40 Exparte hearings were held not to satisfy due process.1a1
Further, the detainee was entitled to a prompt trial on the merits with
the assistance of counsel. 42 The state had the burden of going forward
with evidence on all material issues. '43 The detainee had the right to
the equivalent of a Miranda warning' 44 before being interviewed by a
mental health professional.a 5 Finally, the state was required to investi-
gate the alternatives to confinement and use the least restrictive alterna-
tive. 146
Decided the same year as Lessard, Wyatt v. Sticknev 47 recognized
that civil confinement involves a substantial infringement on liberty,
therefore necessitating that certain rights be accorded to the mentally
ill. "Patients have a constitutional right to a residence unit with screens
or curtains to insure privacy, a comfortable bed, adequate meals, and a
locker or closet for personal belongings." The court also ruled that
"patients cannot be deprived of such privileges as visitors, physical ex-
ercise, selection of suitable clothing, interaction with other people (in-
cluding members of the opposite sex), and attendance at religious
services." 148
135. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
136. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
137. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
138. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
139. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 414
U.S. 473 (1974).
140. Id. at 1091.
141. Id. at 1092.
142. Id. at 1097-1100.
143. Id. at 1095.
144. For a complete explanation of the "Miranda warning" required for criminal deten-
tion, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
145. 349 F. Supp. at 1101.
146. Id. at 1096.
147. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'dsub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974).
148. 344 F. Supp. at 395-407.
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Relying on Wyatt and Rouse v. Cameron,'4 9 Welsch v. Likins150
and Stachulak v. Coughlin5 ' determined that in order to deprive a per-
son of liberty for the purpose of "treatment," due process requires that
such treatment be supplied.'- 2 The consensus of these courts was that
treatment is the process of improving the individual's ability to func-
tion in society. While constitutional standards do not call for actual
improvement, Wyatt v. Aderhol 53 found "a constitutional right to such
individual treatment as will help each of them to be cured or to im-
prove his or her mental condition."' 54
The cases discussed above concern themselves with the protection
of the individual either at the pre-hearing or at the confinement and
treatment stage.' 55 Perhaps the greatest protection can be afforded an
individual at the hearing itself by requiring that a certain standard of
proof be met. The next section will discuss possible degrees of proof,
and what standard is currently required in California.
C. Standard of Proof
The essence of due process is the right to a fair hearing.'56 Tradi-
tionally, a fair hearing has included not only the right to counsel, a
neutral magistrate and other rights listed above, ,57 but also the require-
ment that the party with the burden of proof meet a specified standard.
California Evidence Code section 190 defines "proof' as the establish-
ment by evidence of a requisite degree of belief, 5 8 the amount of doubt
the trier of fact may have and still find for the plaintiff.'5 9 This degree
of belief is ordinarily divided into three levels: a preponderance of evi-
dence (where the degree of belief on one side of the dispute merely
149. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
150. 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974).
151. 364 F. Supp. 686 (N.D. Ill. 1973).
152. The Court in Stachulak reasoned that there is a constitutional right to treatment
"because confining a person on the altruistic theory that he must receive treatment and then
failing to provide it violates due process." Id. at 687.
153. 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
154. Id. at 1312.
155. Welsh dealt with patients involuntarily committed to state hospitals due to retarda-
tion. Petitioner in Stachulak was committed under the Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act and was confined in the psychiatric division of the Illinois State Penitentiary. Appellant
in Rouse was committed for four years upon a finding of guilty by reason of insanity. The
charge was carrying a dangerous weapon, a misdemeanor with a maximum one year sen-
tence.
156. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
157. See notes 130-138 and accompanying text supra.
158. CAL. EvID. CODE § 190 (West 1966) states that, "Proof is the establishment by evi-
dence of a requisite degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the trier of fact or the
court."
159. Dworkin, Easy Cases, BadLaw, andBurdens of Proof 25 VAND. L. REV. 1151, 1160
(1972).
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outweighs the degree of belief on the other), clear and convincing evi-
dence (more belief than that required for a preponderance of evidence),
and proof beyond a reasonable doubt (the highest or most strict stan-
dard of proof).
160
. Preponderance of the Evidence
California Evidence Code section 115 provides that, except where
otherwise specified, the appropriate standard of proof is proof by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 161 A preponderance of the evidence is tra-
ditionally required in civil cases such as fraud,"
2 negligence, 63
nuisance 64 and cases involving child custody and visitation matters.1
65
This standard requires only slightly more evidence on one side than on
the other. In the case of a criminal who is acquitted by reason of in-
sanity, courts have held that a preponderance of the evidence is the
standard necessary to commit the criminal to a mental health care facil-
ity. '
66
160. Legal scholars may deny that the burdens imposed by the various standards of
proof correspond to their reliability. However, a growing number of commentators have
turned to a statistical method of describing standards of proof for lack of a more clear and
efficient method.
Dr. Alan Stone estimates that a preponderance of the evidence requires the trier of fact
to be 51% sure of the defendant's guilt; clear and convincing evidence requires a level of
75%, and beyond a reasonable doubt requires a level of 90%. Statistically speaking, the
higher the required percentage, the lower the probability of error to the detriment of the
defendant. The problem arises, however, not in the clear cases but in those cases which fall
near the specified percentages. For a thorough discussion of this statistical method of esti-
mating reliability, see A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSI-
TION (1975).
161. CAL. EvID. CODE § 115 (West 1966), provides as follows:
"'Burden of Proof means the obligation of a party to establish by evidence a requisite
degree of belief concerning a fact in the mind of the trier of fact or the court. The burden of
proof may require a party to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the existence or nonexis-
tence of a fact or that he establish the existence or nonexistence of a fact by a preponderance
of the evidence, by clear and convincing proof, or by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Except as otherwise provided by law, the burden of proof requires proof by a prepon-
derance of the evidence."
162. Ratay v. Lincoln Nat'l Ins. Co., 405 F.2d 286 (3rd Cir. 1968).
163. Southern Ariz. York Refrig. Co. v. Bush Mfg. Co., 361 F.2d 336 (9th Cir. 1966).
164. People v. Frangadakis, 184 Cal. App. 2d 540, 7 Cal. Rptr. 776 (1960).
165. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
166. United States v. Brown, 478 F.2d 606 (D.C. Cir. 1973). However, in one "defective
delinquent" case, Justice Douglas dissented from the majority's dismissal of certiorari with
these words: "Petitioners have thus been taken from their families and deprived of their
constitutionally protected liberty under the same standard of proof applicable to run-of-the-
mill automobile negligence actions." Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal Court, 407 U.S. 355,
359 (1972) (Douglas, J. dissenting).
2 Clear and Convincing Evidence
Where "various interests of society are pitted against restrictions
on the liberty of the individual,"' 67 the court will require more than a
balance tipped slightly one way or the other. For questions of oral
agreements to make a will,' 68 proof of non-intercourse to overcome the
rebuttable presumption of legitimacy of a child,169 and in disbarment
proceedings,170 proof by clear and convincing evidence is required.
This standard is also called "clear, strong and convincing," 171 or "so
clear as to leave no substantial doubt,"'171 serving to make this standard
less distinguishable from the others.
In State ex rel Hawks v. Lazaro,17 1 the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia held that the "current state of the medical arts" did
not lend itself to requiring the exclusion of "every reasonable
doubt." 174 While holding that "clear, cogent and convincing evidence"
was appropriate for civil commitment, the court indicated that the
highest standard of proof was desirable.' 75 In Lynch v. Baxley,176 an
Alabama federal district court appeared to require "clear, unequivocal
and convincing evidence" for civil commitment proceedings, but also
said that the necessity for commitment must be "proved by evidence
having the highest degree of certitude reasonably attainable in view of
the nature of the matter at issue. .. .
3. Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt
In criminal cases the prosecution's burden is to establish the de-
fendant's guilt by "proof beyond a reasonable doubt."7 8 This standard
167. In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
168. Lynch v. Lichtenthaler, 85 Cal. App. 2d 437, 193 P.2d 77 (1948).
169. Estate of Walker, 180 Cal. 478, 181 P. 792 (1919).
170. In re Palmer, 72 N.M. 305, 383 P.2d 264 (1963).
171. Id. at 308, 383 P.2d at 267.
172. In re Jost, 117 Cal. App. 2d 379, 256 P.2d 71 (1953).
173. 202 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1974).
174. Id. at 126.
175. Id. at 126-27.
176. 386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974).
177. Id. at 393.
178. Opinions in many cases would indicate that throughout the years, courts have as-
sumed that "beyond a reasonable doubt" was a constitutional standard. See, e.g., Mullaney
v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121, 138 (1954); Wilson v.
United States, 232 U.S. 563, 569-70 (1914); Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 312 (1881).
In a criminal case, if the issue is not an element of the offense charged, the prosecution's
burden is reduced from beyond a reasonable doubt to proof by a preponderance of the
evidence. See, e.g., People v. Cavanaugh, 44 Cal. 2d 252, 262, 282 P.2d 53, 59 (1955) (Terri-
torial jurisdiction of the offense). The defendant using the insanity defense need only prove
his "insanity" by a preponderance of the evidence. People v. Daugherty, 40 Cal. 2d 876,
901; 256 P.2d 911, 926 (1953). To establish that he was incapable of harboring the specific
mental state which is an element of the crime charged, the defendant need only introduce
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was reaffirmed in the recent case of In re Win shop.179 In that case the
Supreme Court specifically held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt
applied to every proceeding in which violation of a criminal law was
charged or as to which criminal sanctions could be imposed. 80 In the
initial adjudication in 1967, a New York Family Court judge found
Samuel Winship, then twelve years old, guilty by a preponderance of
the evidence of stealing $112 from a woman's purse. This act consti-
tutes the crime of larceny if committed by an adult. The judge relied
on a section of the New York Family Court Act which provides that an
adjudicatory finding concerning a juvenile must be based on a prepon-
derance of the evidence. The Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court affirmed without an opinion.' 8" The New York Court
of Appeals also affirmed,' 2 expressly sustaining the constitutionality of
the Family Court Act section.
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court first reiterated that proof
beyond a reasonable doubt is required in adult criminal cases due to
the deprivation of liberty and stigma which would result from a convic-
tion. '83 It then held that such proof is also required in juvenile pro-
ceedings where the same consequences could result as from a criminal
conviction." 4 If the juvenile is convicted of committing an act which
would be a crime if committed by an adult, the resulting confinement
and stigma can be as severe as that arising from a criminal convic-
tion.'85 Thus, the Court rejected theparenspatriae argument that juve-
nile proceedings are designed to save, rather than punish the child.'86
The Court then affirmed its holding in In re Gault,8 7 stating that, "civil
labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate the need for crim-
inal due process safeguards in juvenile courts .... .188 The Court
stressed that a court must look to the realities of the situation and not
mere labels.8 9
The language in Winship, Lazaro and Baxley indicates that there
is no definitive line which divides "clear and convincing proof' and
evidence of his "diminished capacity" sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt in the trier of
fact's mind. People v. Genery, 257 Cal. App. 2d 607, 610; 65 Cal. Rptr. 235, 238 (1968).
179. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
180. Id. at 364.
181. 30 A.D.2d 781,.291 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (1968).
182. 24 N.Y.2d 196, 229 N.Y.S.2d 414 (1969).
183. 397 U.S. at 361-64. While the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was
assumed to be the correct standard for many years, it was first explicitly so recognized in this
case. There is nothing in the Constitution which expressly mandates this standard of proof.
184. 397 U.S. at 368.
185. 397 U.S. at 374 (Harlan, J., concurring).
186. 397 U.S. at 365.
187. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See notes 213-21 and accompanying text infra.
188. 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970).
189. Id.
"proof beyond a reasonable doubt." However, it can be said that
whereas a "preponderance of the evidence" requires only a probability
of truth, "clear and convincing evidence" demands a higher degree of
probability and "proof beyond a reasonable doubt" should approxi-
mate no doubt at all.
The problem of the appropriate standard of proof for civil com-
mitment proceedings reflects the difficulties which are inherent in the
relationship between law and mental health.' 90 At present, only one
state legislatively requires a preponderance of the evidence standard,' 9'
thirteen states require clear and convincing evidence, 9 2 and four states
require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 93 The standard of proof
question was further obfuscated when, within a 30 day period in 1977,
three state supreme courts reached differing decisions regarding the ap-
propriate standard of proof. Texas adopted the less rigorous prepon-
derance of the evidence standard, 94 Illinois held for a showing of clear
and convincing evidence,'95 and New Hampshire adopted proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt.'96
In the Texas case of State v. Turner, 97 respondent Dan Turner
was committed to a state hospital for an indefinite period of time. The
trial court instructed the jury that the state's burden was to prove
mental illness by clear and convincing evidence. The court of civil ap-
peals reversed and held that the proper standard of proof was proof
beyond a reasonable doubt.'98 The Texas Supreme Court, after dis-
cussing the rationale behind civil commitment and listing the cases
which had adopted each of the possible standards of proof, held that a
preponderance of the evidence is the correct standard to apply.
The Texas Supreme Court chose the preponderance of the evi-
190. Share, The Standard of Proof in Involuntary Civil Commitment Proceedings, 1977
DET. C. L. REv. 209, 213 (1977).
191. This state is: Mississippi-Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-75 (Supp. 1978).
192. These states are: Arizona-ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-532, -540 (1974); Colo-
rado-COLO. REv. STAT. § 27-10-111 (Supp. 1978); Delaware-DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16,
§ 5010(2) (Supp. 1976); Iowa-IowA CODE ANN. § 225.11 (West Supp. 1978); Maine-ME.
REv. STAT. tit. 34, § 2334 (1978); Michigan-MicH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1465 (1975);
Minnesota-MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253A.07(17) (West Supp. 1978); Pennsylvania-PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 50, § 7304(f) (Purdon Supp. 1979); South Carolina-S.C. CODE § 44-17-580 (1977);
South Dakota-S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 27A-9-18 (1976); Tennessee-TENN. CODE
ANN. § 33-604(d) (Supp. 1977); Washington-WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.310 (1975);
and West Virginia-W. VA. CODE § 27-5-4G)(3) (Supp. 1979).
193. These states are: Montana-MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 38-1305(7) (Supp. 1977);
Oregon-ORE. REV. STAT. § 426.130 (Repl. Vol. 75-75); Rhode Island-R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 40.1-5-8(10) (1977); and Utah-UTAH CODE ANN. § 64-7-36(10) (Supp. 1979).
194. State v. Turner, 556 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1977).
195. In re Stephenson, 67 Ill.2d 544, 367 N.E.2d 1273 (1977).
196. Proctor v. Butler, 117 N.H. 927, 380 A.2d 673 (1977).
197. 556 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1977).
198. Turner v. State, 543 S.W.2d 453 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976).
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dence standard for seemingly opposing reasons. The involuntarily
committed person, according to the Turner majority, is entitled to treat-
ment, periodic review and subsequent release when he is "cured."' 99
Thus, the mental patient's loss of liberty is less severe than that suffered
by an incarcerated criminal. The court also noted that requiring the
highest standard of proof, as in criminal cases, would severely impair
the state's parenspatriae function.2 0 But the majority went on to state
that psychiatry is an inexact science and should not be held to a burden
of proof which it could not bear.20 Thus, while saying on the one hand
that psychiatric treatment makes incarceration in a mental health facil-
ity less severe than criminal incarceration, the court held, on the other
hand, that psychiatry is inexact and should not be expected to conform
to a higher burden of proof.
In In re Stephenson,1° 2 a majority of the Illinois Supreme Court
held that the appellant, who had been found unfit to stand trial on
criminal charges, could be committed to a state mental health facility
on the basis of clear and convincing evidence. The opinion was almost
entirely a discussion of the competing interests of the mentally ill per-
son and society. As in Turner, the court concluded that psychiatry is as
yet incapable of the precision required to establish proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, thus requiring a lesser standard.20 3 However, the Illi-
nois Court held that a preponderance of the evidence is an
inappropriate standard because it may encourage erroneous commit-
ment. In choosing the middle standard, the court focused on four fac-
tors: (1) erroneous commitment is less harmful than erroneous
criminal incarceration;2" (2) Illinois law provides for speedy release
when treatment is no longer needed and requires periodic review of
detention;205 (3) a higher standard of proof would place an impossible
burden on the state;206 and (4) commitment is for the patient's own
welfare.20 7 The court cited opinions from other jurisdictions which had
also adopted clear and convincing evidence as the appropriate standard
of proof in support of its result. Ultimately, the court concluded that
the question of requiring clear and convincing evidence rather than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt was best left for resolution by the
legislature.0 8
199. 556 S.W.2d at 566.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. 67 Ill. 2d 544, 367 N.E.2d 1273 (1977).
203. Id. at 555-56, 367 N.E.2d at 1277-78.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 556-57, 367 N.E,2d at 1278.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 559, 367 N.E.2d at 1279.
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The New Hampshire Supreme Court, in Proctor v. Butler,20 9
found the Supreme Court's rationale in the Winship case persuasive.
The court addressed and rejected each of the arguments in favor of a
lesser standard of proof advanced in Turner and Stephenson.2 1° The
inexactitude of the law, the court concluded, only reinforces the need
for a "standard of proof that will ensure the utmost care in reaching an
involuntary commitment decision."2 1' Relying, as had the Supreme
Court in Winship, on the loss of liberty and the stigma, which it com-
pared to that resulting from adult criminal incarceration, the Proctor
court held that due process requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.21 2 The uncertain state of the law and of society's knowledge
concerning mental illness is apparent from the foregoing analysis of
these three cases. While these state courts all examined essentially the
same factors, they were all able to reach different results due to their
differing interpretations of the import of the relevant factors.
This pattern of differing interpretations is reflected throughout the
United States. In re Gault,21 decided a few years prior to the Winship
case, dealt with a juvenile delinquency proceeding. In that case, Ger-
ald Gault, a fifteen year old, was ordered committed to the State Indus-
trial School until majority, as a penalty for lewd telephone calls he
allegedly made. Under Arizona law, no appeals are permitted in juve-
nile cases. A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was filed, but the
Arizona Supreme Court dismissed it, holding that procedural due proc-
ess requirements had been met.214 The United States Supreme Court,
after a lengthy discussion of the juvenile delinquency and parens pa-
triae concepts, first held that adequate notice sufficient to meet consti-
tutional standards was not given.215 The Court refused to accept the.
state court's rationale that the procedure was intended to shield "the
child from the public stigma of knowledge of his having been taken
into custody and scheduled for hearing. . ". ." I The Court continued
by holding that Gault was denied the right to counsel, the right of con-
frontation, the privilege against self-incrimination and the right of
cross-examination. 217 Thus, the Court held that juveniles facing civil
commitment must be afforded all the rights available in criminal prose-
cutions.
209. 117 N.H. 927, 380 A.2d 673 (1977).
210. Id. at 933-34, 380 A.2d at 676-77.
211. Id. at 934, 380 A.2d at 677.
212. Id. at 932-33, 380 A.2d at 677-78.
213. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also Note, Civil Commitment in Tennessee-What Process is
Due? 8 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 135 (1977).
214. 387 U.S. at 4.
215. Id. at 33-34.
216. Id. at 33.
217. Id. at 34-56.
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As in Roulet, a holding against the petitioner would not have man-
dated civil commitment: the holding with respect to Gault related only
to the adjudicatory process which would follow. The Court said in es-
sence that the realities of the adjudication must be examined; the fact
that a juvenile is committed to an "industrial school" instead of a jail is
of no constitutional consequence, as the juvenile may nevertheless be
deprived of liberty for years. 218 As the Court stated, "a proceeding
where the issue is whether the child will be found to be 'delinquent'
and subjected to the loss of his liberty for years is comparable in seri-
ousness to a felony prosecution. '21 9 The court thus reasoned that due
process in the criminal sense is required and rejected what it called the
"'civil' label-of-convenience. . . Commitment is a deprivation of lib-
erty. It is incarceration against one's will, whether it is called 'criminar
or 'civil.' "220 The key element entitling a person to the protection of
the due process clause is not the nature of the inquiry but rather, the
nature of the deprivation which that inquiry might trigger.22'
Although Gault dealt with juvenile rights, a United States Court of
Appeals specifically rejected the preponderance of evidence standard
for civil commitment proceedings in Lessard v. Schmidt.222 The court
in that case required proof beyond a reasonable doubt.223 The Lessard
court utilized a comparative technique to determine the appropriate
standard of proof. Referring to the Supreme Court's decisions in Gault
and Winshop, the court stated that, "the argument for a stringent stan-
dard of proof is more compelling in the case of a civil commitment
[than in a juvenile hearing] in which an individual will be deprived of
basic civil rights and be certainly stigmatized by the lack of confidenti-
ality of the adjudication. '224 The court also referred to Woodby v. Im-
migration and Naturalization Service,22' a case involving a deportation
proceeding. Reasoning that individuals should not be "banished from
218. Id. at 27.
219. Id. at 36.
220. Id. at 50.
221. Share, The Standard of Proof in Involuntary Civil Commitment Proceedings, 1977
DET. C. L. REy. 209, 243 (1977).
222. 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated and remanded en other grounds, 414
U.S. 473 (1974).
223. 349 F. Supp. at 1094-95. Accord, United States ex rel. Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520
F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
224. 349 F. Supp. at 1095. An individual committed to a mental institution loses numer-
ous civil rights. These include: 1) restrictions on making contracts and limitations on the
right to sue and be sued (Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 319.215, 260.22, 262.06(2)(b) (West Supp.
1972), 296.02, 893.33); 2) restrictions on professional licensing (Wis. STAT. ANN. § 441.07
(West Supp. 1972) (registered and practical nurses), § 447.07 (7) (West Supp. 1972) dentists
and dental hygienists), § 256,286 (attorneys); 3) restrictions on the right to vote (Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 6.03(l), 12.59 (West)). These are very similar to the deprivations which accompany
a finding of "grave disability" in California. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text supra.
225. 385 U.S. 276 (1966).
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this country upon no higher degree of proof than applies in a negli-
gence case,"226 the Supreme Court in Woodby held that the appropriate
standard of proof was clear and convincing evidence. The Lessard
court held that the deprivation of freedom involved in civil commit-
ment is greater than that involved in deportation because a deported
person may still keep his family with him, make contracts, vote and
travel unfettered outside of the United States.227 Finding that a greater
deprivation resulted from civil commitment, the Lessard court required
the higher standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
One of the first attempts by the California Supreme Court to fol-
low the path which Gault and Winshio had paved was People v.
Burnick,228 decided in 1975. Relying heavily on the recent United
States Supreme Court cases of Specht v. Patterson,229 Winshop,23° and
Gault,23' the California Supreme Court held that proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict are required for commit-
ment under the Mentally Disordered Sexual Offender (MDSO) statutes
of the LPS Act.232 The California court's reliance on Gault and Win-
ship is evidence that the personal deprivation of liberty experienced by
an MDSO is far greater than that experienced by a juvenile delin-
quent.233 The stigma and loss of good name experienced is also greater
than that which is typically attached to a juvenile offender and is in fact
more like that of a convicted criminal.2 34 For these reasons "the stan-
dard of proof in mentally disordered sex offender proceedings must be
as high as it is in juvenile delinquency proceedings-to wit, proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt. Anything less will fall short of providing the
level of due process required by the California and federal Constitu-
tions. '235 The dissent in Burnick differentiated the case at bar from
226. Id. at 285.
227. 349 F. Supp. at 1094.
228. 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975).
229. 386 U.S. 605 (1967). Specht concerned the Colorado Sex Offenders Act, which was
essentially the same in outline and purpose as the legislation challenged in Burnick.
230. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). See notes 179-86 and accompanying text supra.
231. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See notes 213-21 and accompanying text supra.
232. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6300 (West 1972). See 14 Cal. 3d at 320, 535 P.2d at
364, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 500.
233. Id at 320-21, 535 P.2d at 361, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 497. "Not only is the mentally
disordered sex offender's loss of freedom more severe than that of the juvenile, it is also of a
much longer duration. Any confinement of the juvenile is ordinarily limited by law to a few
years at most. . . .A person adjudicated a [MDSO] however, is committed for an indeter-
minate period. (CAL. WELF. INST. CODE, §§ 6316, 6326)."
234. 14 Cal. 3d at 321, 535 P.2d at 362, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 498.
235. Id. at 322, 535 P.2d at 362, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 498. Accord, Donaldson v. O'Connor,
493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 419 U.S. 894 (1974) (constitutional right to treat-
ment); Sarzen v. Gaughan, 489 F.2d 1076 (Ist Cir. 1973) (sexual psycopath law); In re Bal-
lay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972),
vacated on other grounds sub norm, Schmidt v. Lessard, 414 U.S. 473 (1974) (proof beyond a
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Winsh and Specht on the grounds that the facts were sufficiently dif-
ferent so as not to be controlling. Justice Burke argued that the pro-
ceedings here were largely predictive in nature.236 The argument was
also made that MDSO proceedings are essentially civil in nature and
therefore required only clear and convincing evidence.237
People v. Feagley,238 another California Supreme Court decision
handed down in 1975, also addressed the issues of standard of proof
and required jury verdict in MDSO proceedings.239 Unlike Burnick,
however, Feagley was adjudged to be "unable to benefit from treat-
ment.""24 After a lengthy discussion of due process and equal protec-
tion under the California and federal Constitutions,' 4 the majority
held that a unanimous jury verdict and proof beyond a reasonable
doubt are required.242 Justice Burke's dissent stressed three main
points. First, as he pointed out in his Burnick dissent, the nature of the
proceeding is "civil" and the purpose of confinement is treatment, not
punishment.24 3 Second, the majority erred, according to Justice Burke,
in holding the confinement unconstitutional for lack of treatment.2'
Third, Burke felt the unanimous jury verdict is not mandated by the
equal protection guarantee.245 He concluded with the thought that be-
cause Feagley had previously been convicted of a criminal offense con-
nected with this MDSO proceeding, he fit into a "special class" which
justified a 3 jury verdict.246
reasonable doubt held to be required in involuntary civil commitment of persons found to
be dangerously mentally ill).
236. 14 Cal. 3d at 333, 535 P.2d at 370, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 506 (Burke, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 335, 535 P.2d at 371, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 507 (Burke, J., dissenting).
238. 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975). This was a 4-3 decision with
Burke, J., writing the dissent in which McComb and Clark, JJ., concurred.
239. Feagley, unlike Burnick, was not committed under the LPS Act but rather under
California's Mentally Disordered Sex Offenders Law. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6300-
6350 (West 1972).
240. 14 Cal. 3d at 344, 535 P.2d at 376, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 512. The California statutory
scheme divides MDSO's into two categories: those who can and those who cannot benefit
from treatment in a state hospital (CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6316). The latter are con-
fined not in a state hospital but in a state institution or institutional unit (CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 6326).
241. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a); U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV. See 14 Cal. 3d at 349-52, 535
P.2d at 380-82, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 515-17.
242. 14 Cal. 3d at 352, 535 P.2d at 382, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 517.
243. Id. at 376, 535 P.2d at 399, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 535 (Burke, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 380-81, 535 P.2d at 401-02, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 537-38 (Burke, J., dissenting).
245. Id. at 382-83, 535 P.2d at 402-03, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 538-39 (Burke, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 383, 535 P.2d at 403, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 539. The majority had relied on Bax-
stom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), and Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972), which
respectively dealt with a person civilly committed at the expiration of a prison sentence
without the jury review available to others civilly committed, and the Wisconsin Sex Crimes
Act, which allowed civil commitment for a period equal to the maximum term of the crime
committed if the crime was sexually motivated.
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The 1977 case of People v. Thomas2 4 7 is one of the last cases in
California, prior to Roulet, to extend the "beyond a reasonable doubt"
standard of proof and the requirement of a unanimous jury verdict to
involuntary commitment proceedings. The court, after careful consid-
eration of its decisions in Burnick and Feagley, applied its rationale of
requiring the above safeguards to cases involving the involuntary com-
mitment of alleged narcotics addicts.248 The court went through a Les-
sard-type comparison24 9 to show that the deprivation and the stigma
attached to a person who is a narcotics addict is far worse than that
experienced by a juvenile delinquent.' In this decision, unlike the
previous decisions in Burnick and Feagley, the majority consisted of six
members of the court,25' with Justice Clark dissenting.
252
D. The Hearing
Section 5350 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code guar-
antees an individual the right to a trial on the issue of "grave disabil-
ity." However, nowhere in that statute or in the Probate Code did the
legislature set out the boundaries and requirements for the "trial." In
practice, the proceeding is a hearing and the courts have been left to
create their own due process standards.
Conservatorship and other civil commitment hearings are ordi-
narily very brief and informal in California and throughout the coun-
try. The State Bar of California's Commission on Law and Mental
Health Problems' Committee on California Mental Health Services
Acts reports that such hearings are oftenproforma and last from 2 to 5
minutes.253 A nationwide study by the National Center for Law and
the Handicapped found that: "Generally, the judge will ask a few
questions concerning the proposed ward and will receive reassuring an-
swers from his attorney or other interested persons. The usual result is
that a guardian is appointed without a careful evaluation being made
247. 19 Cal. 3d 630, 566 P.2d 228, 139 Cal. Rptr. 594 (1977).
248. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3000-3300 (West 1972).
249. See notes 222-27 and accompanying text supra. The Lessard court was one of the
first to use this technique in this area.
250. 19 Cal. 3d at 640-41, 566 P.2d at 234, 139 Cal. Rptr. at 600.
251. The Burnick and Feagley courts were split 4-3.
252. Justice Clark dissented for the same reasons expressed by Justice Burke in Burnick
and Feagley. See notes 236-37 and accompanying text supra and notes 243-46 and accom-
panying text supra.
253. Committee Report, supra note 29, at 14, n.1. An extreme example was reported in
MARC and Thayer v. Wayne County Probate Judge, No. 77-535 (Mich. Ct. App. Nov. 9,
1977). In this case, the judge was convicted of holding guardianship hearings for over 100
people in 75 minutes. See The National Center for Law and the Handicapped, Guardiansho
of the Mentally Impaired" A Critical Analysis, 25 (1977) (unpublished paper).
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of the ward's abilities to care for himself or his needs."
254
Frequently the potential conservatee or detainee is not present at
the hearing.2 55 Often he has not been informed of his right to defend
himself in court and the right to legal assistance.2 56 Adding to these
difficulties is the fact that it is not always easy to communicate with the
outside world from inside a mental health facility. If a person is
drugged during initial detention, he may lack the presence of mind to
seek legal aid or contact friends.257 Once he obtains legal help, he may
be faced with insufficient time to contact witnesses or prepare his de-
fense.2
58
At the hearing, the determinative question is not whether the per-
son is suffering from mental illness or is in need of psychiatric care, but
instead whether that person is mentally ill to such an extent that he is
incapable of caring for himself. This raises the question of the appro-
priate level of proof necessary in a civil commitment hearing. Doctor
Seymour Pollack of the University of Southern California wrote that
proof of "mental disability," which he defines as "the realtionship of
mental impairment to the patient's social role and the impact of the
mentally impaired person upon society, '25 9 should be required for
commitment. He went on to state that it should be supported by evi-
dence of four elements: 1) the mentally ill patient's need for hospitali-
zation and/or treatment as manifested by his clinical condition; 2)
irrational action (rejection of aid); 3) such rejection resulting from his
mental impairment; and 4) consequent dangerousness to himself or
others by virtue of his mental impairment. 60 Thus, Dr. Pollack rejects
involuntary civil commitment on the basis of grave disability and calls
for evidence in the form of an actual clinical condition which will result
in harm. Even this standard, though sufficiently flexible for the mental
health professional, seems vague and overbroad to the legal mind. Dr.
Pollack's position, however, shared by many mental health profession-
als, calls for more evidence than is presently required.b
254. The National Center for Law and the Handicapped, Guardianshoi of the Mentally
Impaired- A CriticalAnalysis, 25 (1977) (unpublished paper).
255. Wexler & Scoville, Special Project: The Administration ofPsychiatric Justice: Theory
and Practice in Arizona, 13 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 39 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Wexler & Sco-
ville].
256. Id. at 51-55 and 69-76.
257. Id. at 33-34. See also Litwack, The Role of Counsel in Civil Commitment Proceed-
ings: Emerging Problems, 62 CAL. L. REV. 816, 830 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Litwack].
258. Wexler & Scoville supra note 255, at 54. Litwack, supra note 257 at 821-22.
259. S. Pollack, Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 9 (unpublished paper prepared for the
1978 Regional Institutes in Law and Mental Health USC Schools of Medicine and Public
Administration) (1978).
260. Id. at 8-9.
261. Presumably, if an actual clinical condition were required, testimony would have to
be elicited concerning the technical diagnosis of the medical condition, the case history of
The subject of the hearing also faces frequently insurmountable
problems in defending himself. In court, the allegedly mentally ill per-
son may not be regarded as a reliable witness for himself.2 62 Every-
thing he does may be seen as a manifestation or result of his illness.2 63
Ultimately, though the law requires that he be given the presumption
of mental soundness, expert testimony will weigh heavily against
him.264 Even under Dr. Pollack's heightened evidentiary standards,
unless objective medical evidence rather than speculation and medical
opinion is required, only four findings need be made to ensure long-
term mental health care detention.
The reason most often given for the informal nature of civil com-
mitment proceedings is that a formal trial tends to upset and unnerve
the mentally ill person.265 Critics of the present system contend that
the adversary process deters families of the mentally ill from seeking
care for their loved ones because of the trauma involved in a "trial. 266
They also argue that requiring the same standards for the mentally ill
person as for the criminal is inappropriate because the patient then
feels threatened and may be unwilling to accept treatment. 267 Retain-
ing the civil hearing, they claim, prevents the trauma but fulfills due
process requirements. The recent discovery of many people improperly
committed, however, may lead one to believe that sufficient due process
safeguards are lacking.268
Another problem fundamental to the nature of the hearing-that
of expert testimony in civil commitment proceedings-is a complex
the individual in relation to the condition and corroborated evidence as to whether the indi-
vidual has displayed symptoms of his diagnosed condition. By limiting the availability of
the term "grave disability," the testimony of the expert witness would require more than a
simple opinion on the issue.
262. Letter from Albert H. Urmer, President, ENKI Research Institute to Susan
Mahony, Staff Attorney, State Bar of California, Committee on Law and Mental Health
Problems (August 1, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Letter].
263. Id.
264. Id. Dr. Urmer wrote: "While apparently the pre LPS committment [sic] process
appeared to be a judicial event, in fact ENKI Research showed that the judges rarely, if
ever, reversed the recommendation of the psychiatrist." He noted later that this policy has
not been affected by the enactment of the LPS Act.
265. For a full discussion of this argument, see Ellis, Volunteering Children: Parental
Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REv. 840, 883-85 (1974).
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Crane, Zonana & Wizner, Implications ofthe Donaldson Decision: 4 Modelfor Peri-
odic Review of Committed Patients, 28 Hosa. & COMMUN. PSYCH. 827 (1977). This article
reports that 53% of the patients surveyed were inappropriately confined on involuntary sta-
tus. See also, After 55 Years, He's Finally Free, Albuquerque Tribune, Aug. 3, 1977, at A-l,
which relates the story of a man who was committed to an institution as mentally retarded in
1920, and was discovered to have an average Intelligence Quotient after 55 years of wrong-
ful confinement.
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one.2 6 9 The quality of expert testimony in such proceedings is being
questioned by mental health as well as legal professionals.27 ° With few
exceptions, the mental health professional serving as an expert witness
has had no special education or training in the field of forensic psychia-
try/psychology.27" ' In recognition of this problem, Chief Justice Bird
has noted that:
'Mental illness' is generally acknowledged to be a vague and un-
certain concept. Categories of mental diseases are notoriously
unclear, often overlapping, and regularly changing. Not surpris-
ingly, there is little consistency in psychiatric diagnoses. There is
also a well-documented tendency of psychiatric personnel to
'over diagnose' the existence of mental illness, sometimes based
on the application of inappropriate criteria such as a psychia-
269. For a full discussion of this topic, see Cairns, People v. Burnick: The California
Supreme Court Extends the Standard of Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt to Civil MDSO
Commitment Proceedings, 10 BEVERLY HILLS B.A.J. 83, 90-95 (1976) (author aruges that
concept of "dangerousness" is nebulous and difficult to define); Dershowitz, The Law of
Dangerousness. Some Fictions about Predictions, 23 JOURNAL OF LEOL EDUC. 24 (1970)
(general discussion on predictions of dangerousness and their unreliability); Diamond, The
Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 439 (1974); Ennis & Litwack,
Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise. Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L.
REV. 693 (1974) (authors conclude that psychiatrists tend to overpredict and testimony tends
to be unreliable); Shah, Some Interactions of Law and Mental Health in the Handling of
Social Deviance, 23 CATH. U.L. REV. 674 (1974) (author concludes that reliance on experts
and expert testimony in the courtroom is too heavy).
270. The State Bar of California's Commission on Law and Mental Health Report indi-
cates that perhaps the issues of "competence to make mental health care decisions" and the
"right to refuse treatment" might better be left to legal professionals. Alternative answers
may be that: (1) expert testimony should be allowed but discounted as compared to the
individual's testimony as to his actions and desires for mental health care; (2) forensic psy-
chiatry should be developed as a science and mental health professionals who testify in civil
commitment hearings should be required to be "certified" as competent in that science; and
(3) Assembly Bill 2895 (March 16, 1978) introduced by Assemblyman Lanterman would
require special medical school training for all psychiatrists and psychologists. Each depart-
ment would have to submit a report to the Legislature yearly concerning the implementation
of forensic training programs.
271. Letter from Seymour Pollack to Susan Mahony, Staff Attorney, Committee on
Mental Health Law (August 4, 1977). A portion of the letter from Dr. Pollack reads:
"Generally Accepted Givens:
(1) That the input of forensic sciences, including forensic psychiatry, to the field of litiga-
tion will probably continue to increase substantially in the foreseeable future.
(2) That the expertise of the mental health professional, as the psychiatric expert witness in
issues of litigation, in contrast to the evidentiary input from other forensic sciences, espe-
cially that visible in publicized criminal-legal cases, is less than desirable.
(3) That the credibility of the psychiatric expert witness is generally quite poor.
(4) That, with very few exceptions, the mental health professional serving as a psychiatric
expert witness enters into the litigation arena with no special education or training in this
field. This circumstance has served to promote the poor quality of the psychiatric expert
witness, especially in light of the increasing complexity of many mental health/law issues
(e.g., the criminal-legal matter of diminished capacity).
CONSERVATORSHIP OF ROULET
trist's ersonal biases regarding a patient's age, race, sex or social
class. 2V2 (footnotes omitted).
In addition to the uncertainty involved in psychiatric diagnosis, a
recent development may cause mental health professionals to over di-
agnose their patients. In the wake of the California Supreme Court's
1974 decision in Tarasoff v. Board of Regents,27 3 mental health profes-
sionals have reason to fear civil liability for the actions of their pa-
tients.274 The social outrage engendered by an instance of wrongful
mental health detention can only be equaled by the social outrage at
the disasterous consequences of an under-diagnosis which led to the
death of an innocent person at the hands of a mentally ill person not
recognized as needing help.275 It has been suggested that the best way
of avoiding liability for the fate of the patient (or those he may harm) is
to keep him clutched securely to the mental health care bosom. 276 It is
the lack of expertise, the personal biases, the fear of civil liability and
the "better safe than sorry" 27 7 attitude, compounded by the mental
health professional's ingrained desire to help,278 that leads to an in-
creasing amount of "expert testimony" in civil commitment proceed-
ings without a concommitant increase in the accuracy of that
testimony.
The foregoing analysis demonstrates that substantial individual
freedoms, especially the right to liberty, are implicated by the civil
commitment process. Courts in various jurisdictions have split on the
question of the appropriate standard of proof for civil commitment
proceedings. There are no established standards governing the nature
of such proceedings, which are frequently informal, ex parte, and
which rely heavily on expert testimony. It was against this background
272. Conservatorship of Roulet, 20 Cal. 3d 653, 672, 574 P.2d 1245, 1259, 143 Cal. Rptr.
893, 907 (Bird, C.J. dissenting).
273. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1974).
274. That case held that the psychiatrist had the duty to warn Ms. Tarasoff that one of
his patients had expressed the intention of killing her. Failure to warn, the court held, left
the doctor civilly liable for his patient's actions.
275. Committee Report, supra note 29, at 9.
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. This aspect of mental health care has been blamed for much of the overdiagnosis of
grave disability. A primary school teacher is trained to believe that everyone can benefit
from education and that everyone can learn something more. This is the motivation behind
the teacher's forcing education upon children whether or not they want to learn. Similarly,
it might be said that mental health professionals believe that no one is 100% mentally and
emotionally healthy and that everyone can benefit from mental health care. This altruistic
attitude is the catalyst for mental health care for large numbers of people who may or may
not want such care. See Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 179 SCIENCE 250
(1973) (reprinted in 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 379 (1973)); Ellis, Volunteering Children: Paren-
tal Commitment of Minors to Mental Institutions, 62 CAL. L. REV. 840, 865 (1974).
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that the California Supreme Court was called upon to decide what
process is due an individual facing civil commitment.
III. Conservatorship of Roulet
In 1974, after a hearing on the question of petitioner's grave disa-
bility, the Public Guardian of Santa Barbara County was named con-
servator of the person and estate of Mabel Roulet. The Public
Guardian was awarded general conservatorship powers,279 plus the au-
thority to have Mrs. Roulet confined in a state hospital if the need
arose. 280 Shortly thereafter Mrs. Roulet was confined in Camarillo
State Hospital by the Public Guardian.
The conservator petitioned the court to reestablish the conserva-
torship for an additional year in 1975281 pursuant to his opinion that
Mrs. Roulet was still gravely disabled. At this hearing Mrs. Roulet re-
quested that the jury be instructed on two matters: that reestablishing
the conservatorship required a unanimous vote by the jury, and that
the evidentiary standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was also
required. The trial court refused to give these instructions deeming
them contrary to the LPS Act standards. Instead, the jury was in-
structed that a 3/ vote and proof by a preponderance of the evidence
were sufficient to reestablish the conservatorship. The California Court
of Appeals reversed, relying primarily on Burnick and Winshp.282 It
held that, due to both the stigma attached to a person who has been
adjudged gravely disabled and the risk of erroneous incarceration,
proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a unanimous jury verdict were
mandated.283
A. The Decisions
The California Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals in
Conservatorshop of Roulet.284 Justice Clark, writing for the majority,
focused on three fundamental points: (1) grave disability proceedings
are basically civil in nature; (2) the potential confinement is never in a
criminal setting; and (3) the stigma attached to a person adjudged to be
gravely disabled is not as damaging or severe as the stigma attached to
a criminal or a MDSO.285 Based on these factors, Justice Clark con-
279. See note 93, supra.
280. As authorized by CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5358 (West Supp. 1978).
281. Id. § 5361 (West 1972).
282. Estate of Roulet, 134 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1976).
283. Id.
284. 20 Cal. 3d 653, 574 P.2d 1245, 143 Cal. Rptr. 893 (1978).
285. The petitioner also argued that not requiring a unanimous jury verdict, as provided
for in imminently dangerous proceedings, was a violation of the equal protection clauses of
cluded that proof by clear and convincing evidence and a 3/4 jury vote
are appropriate.
Chief Justice Bird, joined by Justices Tobriner and Mosk, dis-
sented,286 finding that the stigma attached to a person adjudged to be
gravely disabled is far worse than that attached to a criminal.287 Chief
Justice Bird also disagreed with Justice Clark's analysis of the non-
criminal setting, noting that conservatees are often placed in Atas-
cadero and Patton State Hospitals, institutions acknowledged by the
California Supreme Court to be similar to prisons.288 Finally, she took
issue with Justice Clark's use of the "civil label of convenience, '28 9 stat-
ing that it is not "the theoretical nature of the proceedings but
rather. . .the actual consequences of commitment" that are impor-
tant.290
The California Supreme Court reversed its previous holding in
Conservatorship of Roulet on February 6, 1979.291" In an opinion au-
thored by Chief Justice Bird and joined by Justices Tobriner, Mosk and
Newman, the court found the logic of Burnick and Feagley2 92 persua-
sive and held for a higher standard of proof and a unanimous jury
verdict to establish a conservatorship under the LPS Act's grave disa-
bility provisions. By examining the loss of liberty and the stigma at
stake in a grave disability proceeding, the court found applicable the
standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt.293 The court also re-
fused to adopt the minority opinion's use of the civil label of conven-
ience and the presumed benevolent intent of the state in these
proceedings.294 The court framed its conclusion in terms of the con-
tinuity of the law in this area: "There is no logical reason to diverge
from that path [of Burnick, Feagley and Thomas] in this case. To turn
back toward the repudiated criterion of the civil-criminal label serves
only to exalt form over constitutional substance.
'295
1. Civil Nature of Proceedings
The majority in Roulet I held that "whether a proceeding is de-
the state and federal Constitutions. A discussion of the equal protection issue, however, is
beyond the scope of this note.
286. 20 Cal. 3d at 663-73, 574 P.2d at 1251-60, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 899-903 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting, joined by Tobriner and Mosk, JJ.).
287. Id. at 670, 574 P.2d at 1255, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 903.
288. Id. at 667, 574 P.2d at 1253, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 901.
289. Id. at 671, 574 P.2d at 1256, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 904.
290. Id.
291. 23 Cal. 3d 219, 590 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1979).
292. See notes 228-52 and accompanying text supra.
293. 23 Cal. 3d at 225-26, 590 P.2d at 4, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 235, 590 P.2d at 11, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 435.
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nominated civil or criminal, its nature and purpose must be ascertained
by examining its true character. . . Examination of grave disability
proceedings discloses that they are essentially civil in nature."29 6 The
fact that the majority viewed the proceeding as unconnected to crimi-
nal conviction or conduct loomed heavily behind their words. Justice
Clark saw the grave disability proceedings as a necessary outgrowth of
the state'sparenspatriae power.297 Their sole purpose is to protect and
care for the individual, not to protect society or seek retribution. The
court seemed to draw a distinction between dangerous-to-others and
MDSO proceedings, which involve an element of social protection and
thus require a higher standard of proof and gravely disabled proceed-
ings, which are solely concerned with the protection of the individual.
In her Roulet I dissent and again in writing for the majority in
Roulet II, Chief Justice Bird cautioned against the majority's use of the
"civil label of convenience. '  Citing Gault, Chief Justice Bird
stressed that, whether commitment is called criminal or civil, incarcera-
tion against one's will is a deprivation of liberty. As the court in Win-
ship stated, "civil labels and good intentions do not themselves obviate
the need for criminal due process safeguards." '299 The nature of the
incarceration should not be discounted merely because the purpose of
commitment is rehabilitative and not punitive.
At the heart of the dispute over whether a "grave disability" com-
mitment proceeding is "civil" or "criminal' in nature is the problem of
determining exactly where to draw the line between the two. Courts
have traditionally examined a given proceeding to determine whether
the procedural safeguards required for criminal prosecutions should be
constitutionally mandated." The potential for abuse when utilizing
this approach is great because, by labeling a proceeding "civil," the
court can ignore procedural safeguards.3"' Proceedings for the com-
mitment of juveniles, sexual psychopaths, the mentally ill, alcoholics
296. 20 Cal. 3d at 659, 574 P.2d at 1248, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 896-97. See also, Lessard v.
Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), where the court, in citing Kent v. United
States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), raised the same argument with respect to juveniles.
297. See notes 24-26 and accompanying text supra.
298. 20 Cal. 3d at 671, 574 P.2d at 1256, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 904 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
See 23 Cal. 3d at 225, 590 P.2d at 4, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
299. 397 U.S. 358, 365-66 (1970). The United States Supreme Court in Winshio went on
to note that a juvenile proceeding, where a guilty verdict could subject a juvenile to a depri-
vation of liberty for years plus the stigma of being labeled a "delinquent," was comparable
in seriousness to a felony prosecution.
300. Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement: 4 Suggested Framework for Constitutional
Anaolsis, 51 TEX. L. REv. 1277, 1296 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Dershowitz].
301. This may actually encourage a state to eliminate safeguards in order to characterize
the proceeding as civil. This occurred in Michigan in 1937 with regard to a sexual psycho-
path law. See People v. Frontczak, 286 Mich. 51, 281 N.W. 534 (1938).
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and drug addicts have all, at one time, been labeled civil." 2 An ap-
proach such as that outlined above would have the effect of denying
defendants in those proceedings many procedural safeguards to which
they would otherwise be entitled.
Courts subsequently developed a number of analytical techniques
to determine whether a proceeding was "civil" or "criminal." Some
courts simply concluded that the proceeding was civil, without further
explanation.0 3 Other courts looked to whether the proceeding was
based on either the criminal statutes or a civil statute.3 4 Many courts
focused on the legislative intent behind a statute to determine whether
the purpose was to regulate or to punish. 05 Still other courts simply
compared the proceeding with ones that were "clearly" civil or criminal
to determine the classification of the one in question.306 The flaw in
this last technique was that one mislabeled case could easily affect
countless others.
In recent years, courts have begun to turn away from this labeling
technique by looking to the actual procedures and effects of a trial, as
well as the "nature" of the proceeding. Both the majority and dissent-
ing opinions in Roulet I recognized that the nature of the proceedings
and the possible consequences resulting therefrom must be evalu-
ated.307 The majority's evaluation found the potential deprivation of
liberty and resultant stigma insufficient to mandate proof beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. In contrast, Chief Justice Bird's dissenting opinion in
Roulet I and subsequent majority opinion in Roulet II found the po-
tential deprivation of liberty and stigma resulting from involuntary
commitment significant enough to require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.
30 8
Therefore, as a consequence of Roulet II, California courts will no
longer concern themselves merely with labeling a proceeding either
"civil" or "criminal" in order to determine the appropriate standard of
proof. The current state of the law is represented by Chief Justice
Bird's view that the nature of the proceedings and its attendant conse-
quences must first be evaluated before the appropriate standard of
proof can be determined. Furthermore, such an analysis when applied
302. See Dershowitz, smupra note 300, at 1296.
303. Id.
304. See In re De La 0, 59 Cal. 2d 128, 378 P.2d 793, 28 Cal. Rptr. 489, cert. denied, 374
U.S. 856 (1963) (court held that a statute was "civil" even though it appeared in the Penal
Code).
305. Id. at 148-49, 378 P.2d at 806-07, 28 Cal. Rptr. at 500-01.
306. Dershowitz, supra note 300, at 1298 n.75.
307. See 20 Cal. 3d at 659, 574 P.2d at 1248, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
308. 20 Cal. 3d at 670-71, 574 P.2d at 1255-56, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 903-04 (Bird, C.J., dis-
senting), 23 Cal. 3d at 229-30, 590 P.2d at 7, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 431. The requirement of a
unanimous jury verdict followed from the analysis of the appropriate standard of proof.
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to involuntary commitment proceedings bears the conclusion that the
threat to the individual's liberty and good name are of significant im-
port, therefore requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt in order to
satisfy due process considerations.
2 Criminal Setting
The majority in Roulet I found that "Confinement does not neces-
sarily follow establishment of the conservatorship. If it occurs at all,
confinement is never in a criminal setting."309 Justice Clark relied on
section 5358 of the Welfare and Institutions Code, which precludes
confinement in a penal institution or criminal facility.310 While it is
true that Mrs. Roulet would not have been confined in a criminal facil-
ity for mental health treatment, there is a substantial amount of evi-
dence contrary to the notion that confinement is never in a "criminal
setting."31'
As Chief Justice Bird noted in her dissenting opinion in Roulet I
and her majority opinion in Roulet II, a significant number of con-
servatees are placed in Atascadero and Patton State Hospitals." 2
These hospitals contain approximately 60 percent and 40 percent, re-
spectively, of the MDSO's committed to state institutions in Califor-
nia.313 In Burnick and Feagley the California Supreme Court was
persuaded that the commitment of MDSO's was similar enough to
criminal deprivation of liberty to require the same standard of proof as
in criminal cases. Part of the court's reasoning in those cases was based
on the descriptions of Atascadero State Hospital given by respected
members of the California Medical Association,31 4 as well as by senior
staff members of Atascadero itself.315 All of these medical profession-
als described Atascadero as closer to a prison or correctional facility in
its appearance than to a hospital.31 6
309. 20 Cal. 3d at 660, 574 P.2d at 1249, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
310. "A conservator... shall have the right, if specified in the court order, to place his
conservatee in a medical, psychiatric, nursing, or other state-licensed facility, or a state hos-
pital .... "
311. 14 Cal. 3d at 319, 535 P.2d at 360, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
312. 20 Cal. 3d at 667, 574 P.2d at 1253, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 901 (Bird, C.J., dissenting), 23
Cal. 3d at 226, 590 P.2d at 5, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 429.
313. Id.
314. See People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 319 n.10, 535 P.2d 352, 365 n.10, 121 Cal.
Rptr. 488, 501 n.10 (1975).
315. Id. This testimony was given by Dr. Harold M. Rogallo, senior psychiatrist on the
Atascadero staff. Dr. Rogallo described Atascadero as "the only 'maximum security' hospi-
tal in the Department of Mental Hygiene."
316. Id. at 319, 535 P.2d at 360, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 496: "In its physical appearance, this is
much more like a prison than a hospital. In its architectural planning, it disregards the
modem psychiatric concept of the therapeutic community. There are bare corridors, bars,
iron gates, rows of cells-all the stigmata of punishment rather than treatment."
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Since conservatees can be routinely placed in the same facilities
which house MDSO's, 317 it can be argued that they should be afforded
the same procedural safeguards available to MDSO's, including the
same standard of proof, prior to commitment. However, whether Atas-
cadero, Patton or any other state institution is deemed a "criminal set-
ting" is overshadowed by other considerations for purposes of
determining the appropriate standard of proof. As the courts in Win-
ship and Lessard v. Schmidt pointed out,3 18 a higher standard of proof
is mandated if the risk of deprivation of liberty and stigma are as great,
or nearly as great, as those of a criminal proceeding. Still, as Chief
Justice Bird noted for the majority in Roulet II, "the mere fact that
appellant found herself confined in a hospital rather than a prison does
not eliminate the need to protect her againstfalse confinement. ' 320 It is
the fact of possible confinement in what is effectively a criminal setting
that is critical and determinative of the procedural safeguards that the
individual must be afforded.
3. Stigma
In its discussion of the stigma attached to a person adjudged to be
gravely disabled, the majority in Roulet I differentiated that stigma
from the kind associated with a convicted criminal or an MDSO:
"Criminal convictions carry society's opprobrium based on fear and
distrust. A gravely disabled person is far more likely to be viewed by
society with compassion instead of fear. A prior criminal conviction
may impose continuing legal impairment. The Act, on the other hand,
prohibits any presumption of incompetence."32 While in an ideal soci-
ety this would perhaps be true, Chief Justice Bird argued in her dissent
in Roulet I and her majority opinion in Roulet II that this view ignores
reality.
322
Once knowledge of a person's past commitment becomes known
to a prospective employer, co-worker or peer,32 3 it is easily seen, yet
317. 20 Cal. 3d at 667, 574 P.2d at 1253, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 901 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
318. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970); Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078,
1088-89 (E.D. Wis. 1972).
319. As previously observed, see notes 45-52 and accompanying text supra, petitioner
here risked losing the right to contract, the right to travel unimpeded and the right to man-
age her money and property. Compare Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078, 1089 (E.D.
Wis. 1972), where the court found that the loss of the right to contract, along with profes-
sional licensing restrictions and jury duty restrictions (Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 319.215, 260.22
(West Supp. 1972), 256.286, 447.07(7) (West Supp. 1972), 6.03(l), 12.59; Wis. CONST. art. 3,
§ 2), were civil deprivations which result from a criminal conviction.
320. 23 Cal. 3d at 227, 590 P.2d at 5, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 429 (emphasis in original).
321. 20 Cal. 3d at 660, 574 P.2d at 1249, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 897.
322. Id. at 669-70, 574 P.2d at 1255, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 903 (Bird, C.J., dissenting); 23 Cal.
3d at 228-30, 590 P.2d at 6-7, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 430-43.
323. The trial is public record. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5118 (West 1972).
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difficult to prove, that subtle but damaging discrimination can occur.324
Rather than being the subjects of understanding and compassion, Chief
Justice Bird pointed out in Roulet II, that the mentally ill are often
viewed with suspicion and even loathing.325 She noted that the Califor-
nia Supreme Court recently recognized the stigma which attaches to
the mentally ill3 2 6 "It is implausible," she wrote, "that a person la-
belled by the state as so totally ill could go about, after his release,
seeking employment, applying to schools, or meeting old acquaintances
with his reputation fully intact. 327 One further point, which Chief Jus-
tice Bird failed to note, is that conservatorship proceedings for persons
accused of being "gravely disabled" are open to the public, and the
permanent records become public records. 28
Other commentators have also suggested that the stigma attached
to being adjudged mentally ill is just as great, if not greater than that
attached to a criminal conviction.3 29 A recent study conducted at San
Jose State University found that:
[t]he mentally ill are seen as a special class of beings to be feared,
scorned, pitied or degraded. It is believed that they are capable
of engaging in only the simplest tasks and are not able to know
what is in their own best interests. The assignment of the sick
role promotes helplessness, dependence, and a feeling that there
is no personal, familial, or society responsibility for the person's
disturbed behavior or emotions. It also carries the potential for
self-devaluation. Stigmatization works in the nature of a self-ful-
filling prophecy.
Even when the patient is later cured of the behavioral symp-
toms that resulted in his being classified mentally ill, the public
will not usually accept such cures as permanent. The ex-patient
324. Lashly, Legal Issues in State Mental Health Care- Proposalsfp'r Change, 2 MENT.
DISAB. L. RPTR. 57, 70 (July-Aug. 1977).
325. 23 Cal. 3d at 229, 590 P.2d at 7, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
326. Id., citing In re Roger S., 19 Cal. 3d 921, 929, 569 P.2d 1286, 1200-91, 141 Cal. Rptr.
298, 302-03 (1977).
327. 23 Cal. 3d at 229, 590 P.2d at 7, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
328. See note 323 supra.
329. The stigma borne by the mentally ill has frequently been identified in'the literature:
"a former mental patient may suffer from the social opprobrium which attaches to treatment
for mental illness and which may have more severe consequences than do the formally im-
posed disabilities. Many people have an 'irrational fear of the mentally ill.' The former
mental patient is likely to be treated with distrust and even loathing; he may be socially
ostracized and victimized by employment and educational discrimination. Finally, the indi-
vidual's hospitalization and post-hospitalization experience may cause him to lose self-confi-
dence and self-esteem.
The legal and social consequences of commitment constitute the stigma of mental ill-
ness, a stigma that could be as socially debilitating as that of a criminal conviction." (Foot-
notes omitted) Developments in the Law, Civil Commitment ofthe Mentally Ill, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1190, 1200-01 (1974); accord, Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places, 13 SANTA
CLARA LAW. 379, 385 (1973).
is prevented in many obvious and subtle ways from resuming his
customary roles or from taking on any new ones. Seldom is he
trained to be, expected to be, or allowed to be a productive and
functional member of society.33°
It becomes more important to most people that a person was classified
as mentally ill than to determine the nature or extent of that person's
illness or present state of health. 3 '
Thus, it appears that despite the altruistic view of the Roulet I ma-
jority as to the public's attitude toward the mentally ill, the prevailing
opinion is that the stigma attached to these individuals is indeed great.
This is an additional justification for damanding a higher standard of
proof before an individual can be involuntarily committed. In Roulet
II, this aspect of being classified as gravely disabled provided further
support for the conclusion that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is re-
quired.
B. Analysis
1. Abuses of Grave Disability Proceedings and the ConservatorshiF
Device
Despite the recent California Court of Appeals decision which
held the LPS Act definition of "gravely disabled" not unconstitution-
ally vague or overbroad,332 there is strong evidence that the statutory
scheme is being abused. It has been suggested that the classification of
"gravely disabled" is so vague that many courts are using it as a catch-
all to confine persons whom they feel should be confined but as to
whom they have an insufficient basis for commitment under the dan-
gerousness statutes. The Warren study3 33 found that the courts were
utilizing what she termed a "bargaining down" technique334 to insure
the commitment of persons whom the court, for some reason felt
should be committed. The evidence suggests that the criteria for grave
disability are being manipulated by the courts for convenience sake.335
330. A Review of Caifornia's Programsfor the Mentally Disabled.- Public Hearings on
House Resolution 106 Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Mental Health and Develop-
mental Disabilities, 84 (November 18, 1977) (Teknekron, Inc.).
331. Sarbin & Mancuso, Failure of a Moral Enterprise: Attitudes of the Public Toward
Mental Illness, 35 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCH. 159 (1970).
332. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
333. See Warren note 61 and accompanying text supra.
334. Id.at 645.
335. In an accompanying article, Monahan, Empirical Analyses of Civil Commitment:
Critique and Context, 11 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 619, 620 (1977), Warren is criticized for her use
of the term "bargaining down." Monahan instead advocates use of the term "selective
targeting" to show that the state is merely deciding which criteria to pursue to accomplish
commitment. Monahan generally agreed with Warren's observations but criticized the rela-
tively small sample size of her testing, which amounted to about 10% of the civilly commit-
ted population of her area. Id. at 621.
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"Bargaining down" is a procedure which occurs between the 72
hour hold period of a person committed under LPS and the habeas
corpus hearing granted to one who petitions for such relief.336 It is
analogous to the plea bargaining which occurs in a criminal prosecu-
tion. The difference is that in bargaining down, the person affected has
no input as to what is happening and in fact is usually ignorant of the
entire procedure. The judge, the District Attorney and the public de-
fender will usually get together out of court and "bargain down" the
original grounds for commitment to less severe grounds.337 Warren
found in her sample study that only 11% of the people committed were
originally committed for grave disability and given 72 hour hold peri-
ods. By the time the habeas corpus hearings were granted, the percent-
age of those committed for grave disability had jumped to 52%.
338
Most of this increase can be attributed to the fact that people who were
originally committed for dangerousness to others, dangerousness to self
and grave disability were later reclassified solely as gravely disabled.
33 9
In one case which Warren witnessed, the judge, the District Attor-
ney and the public defender bargained in the courtroom, "to ensure
that the petitioner-originally committed for danger to others but not
grave disablement-was not released on writ. Because no adequate ev-
idence could be introduced showing that he was imminently dangerous,
grave disablement was substituted in place of dangerous to others.
'340
This is not to suggest that the courts have an evil motive in conducting
these kinds of hearings or that they occur in every court. However, the
very fact that this kind of manipulation does occur and that many indi-
viduals who were originally considered "dangerous" are being commit-
ted as "gravely disabled" indicates that the standard of proof needed to
commit a person for "grave disability" should be as high as that for a
person considered imminently dangerous to others.
Another study, conducted by Grant Morris,34' came to the conclu-
sion that the LPS conservatorship device is being used as an "escape
hatch" to prolong the institutional confinement of nondangerous per-
sons.342 Morris utilized statistical evidence showing the number of in-
dividuals in California who were detained on 72-hour holds, and from
this the number of persons detained on 14-day treatment periods, 90-




340. Id. at 646. Often a public defender will help to commit his client "for his own
good" rather than proceeding as an advocate for the individual.
341. Morris, Conservatorshi.' for the "Gravely Disabled California s Nondeclaration of
Nonindependence, 15 SAN DIEGO L.REv. 201 (1978).
342. Id. at 214. See also, A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSI-
TION, 64 (1975).
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day post-certification periods and conservatorship status.343 Morris'
point was that, given the time constraints for observation mandated by
the LPS Act, there naturally has to be a way of classifying persons
whom it is felt should be confined for longer periods than allowed. The
conservatorship device provides such an escape hatch. Morris viewed
the use of conservatorship status as a surrogate for the 90-day post-
certification hold. He based this observation, however, on the fact that
there were no individuals detained for a 90-day post-certification pe-
riod while many individuals were placed under conservatorships. 3 4
This may not support the conclusion that the conservatorship device is
encompassing those imminently dangerous individuals who should be
detained on 90-day periods. The statistics, however, do at the least sug-
gest such a practice. Morris further pointed out, although he failed to
provide any statistical proof, that "the definite impression of many data
gatherers is that the conservatorship device is used to avoid the neces-
sity of obtaining consent to treatment from recalcitrant patients. 345
2. Medical Evidence of Abuses of Grave Disability
Not all charges that the conservatorship device is being abused
come from the legal profession. Persons in the medical profession have
also witnessed some of these occurrences. In a recent paper,346 Dr.
Donald Schwartz referred to the "grave disability" category as a
"wastebasket. '347 Dr. Schwartz claimed that this category is used to
detain and treat people who may be mentally ill but who could none-
theless survive in the community on their own.348 The rationale behind
this theory is that there are certain people whose condition may not fall
within the intended scope of the LPS Act, but who still represent an
embarrassment to society. Thus, to keep these mentally ill individuals
out of the mainstream of society they are committed under the classifi-
cation "gravely disabled."
The common conclusion of these studies, that the conservatorship
device is being used unjustly to detain people at both ends of the men-
tally ill spectrum, is hard to ignore. People who present a danger to
others are on one end of the spectrum and people who are capable of
caring for themselves but are an embarrassment to society are on the
other end. According to these commentators, the conservatorship de-
343. Id. at 214-15.
344. Id. at 215 n.77.
345. Id. at 225.
346. Schwartz, SoialAmbivalence over Involuntary Treatment, 16 PSYCHIATRIC OPINION
25 (April 1979). Dr. Schwartz is currently a professor of psychiatry at the UCLA Medical
School.
347. Id. at 27.
348. Id.
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vice is being used in violation of the intent of its creators to incarcerate
everyone within the spectrum.
The majority in Roulet II also recognized this problem as more
than a theoretical one: "'Mental illness' is generally acknowledged to
be a vague and uncertain concept. Categories of mental diseases are
notoriously unclear, often overlap, and frequently change. The experts
themselves often disagree on what is an appropriate diagnosis. 349
Thus, the court found sufficient inexactitude, overlap and confusion in
classifying mentally ill persons to require proof beyond a reasonable
doubt to assure that a person about to be adjudged gravely disabled be
afforded adequate procedural safeguards.
Conclusion
The enactment of the LPS Act in California inaugurated one of
the most revolutionary and humane civil commitment policies in the
country. With its focus on the rights of the individual and the inclusion
of safeguards to protect those rights, it represented a new wave of
thought in the area of civil commitment. In keeping with these con-
cepts of individual rights and due process of law, cases such as Burnick,
Feagley and Thomas mandated a high standard of proof to protect the
rights of MDSO's and narcotics addicts. These same concerns were
held in Roulet II to mandate proof beyond a reasonable doubt and a
unanimous jury verdict for the commitment of gravely disabled per-
sons. The loss of liberty and stigma attached to a person adjudged
gravely disabled are every bit as severe as those experienced by an
MDSO or convicted criminal. Also, the inexactitude and predictive na-
ture of psychiatry require that a person receive the greatest possible
protection before being committed. It can therefore be argued that the
appropriate standard of proof for all portions of the civil commitment
process is proof beyond a reasonable doubt. This includes the habeas
corpus hearing, the conservatorship hearing and subsequent hearings
to renew conservatorship.
At this point, however, society must step back from constitutional
form and look to the substance and the realities of civil commitment.
Justice Clark's concurring and dissenting opinion in Roulet 11 focused
upon a fundamental issue when he wrote in his opening paragraph:
The thesis of the majority opinion appears to be that because
the state has failed in caring for persons suffering mental disabili-
ties, only persons with the* gravest disabilities-those who by
unanimous opinion beyond any reasonable doubt are gravely
disabled-should be exposed to the degradations of adjudication
as mentally ill. If what the majority say of the chamber-of-hor-
rors atmosphere at our mental institutions (none of which ap-
349. 23 Cal. 3d at 234, 590 P.2d at 10, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 434.
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pears in the record of this case) is true, does it follow that only
those needing thegreatest help should be subjected to such a de-
fective program?3
This is a wise observation. The essence of the vast problems in mental
health law can be found in the system itself. The California Supreme
Court in Roulet II was concerned with the requisite levels of due proc-
ess to incarcerate a woman under a grave disability statute. But in the
wake of that decision society must focus its attention on mental illness,
treatability and competence to make one's own mental health care de-
cisions.
This approach is discussed in the State Bar of California's Report
of the Commission on Law and Mental Health."' The Commission
began its discussion by showing that detention on the basis of grave
disability and dangerousness is inaccurate. Grave disability, according
to the Commission, is not only the least well defined basis for involun-
tary detention, but it "has been distorted in practice to permit treatment
to be provided to those who are chronically mentally ill and who con-
stitute public nuisances or embarrassments, but who could survive on
their own if left in society. ' 35 2 Dangerousness, reports the Commis-
sion, is not predictable and should not be a concern of the mental
health care system.353 People who have committed dangerous acts
should be housed by the criminal justice system or by a new system
designed to assist them. Psychiatrists and the mental health care sys-
tem should concern themselves with the mentally ill, not predictions of
dangerousness. The Commission suggested a revolutionary approach
to mental health. The criteria for commitment it set forth are: 1) a
judgment by a mental health professional as to a person's mental ill-
ness, a finding that there is a diagnosable disorder; 2) the likelihood of
his treatability; and 3) and evaluation by the judicial system as to the
individual's competence to make decisions concerning his mental
health care. 4
It is the Commission's belief that mental health facilities should be
used only for treatment of the mentally ill. If a person is untreatable,
he should be placed in a facility other than one which is used for the
treatable mentally ill. The primary reason for this is the debilitating
atmosphere of a mental hospital which houses incurable or untreatable
people. This atmosphere engenders a feeling of hopelessness which
makes it difficult to fight off a worsening condition of dependence when
one is surrounded by incurable mentally ill people. Further, the right
350. Id. at 235-36, 590 P.2d at 11, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 435 (Clark, J., concurring and dis-
senting).
351. Committee Report, supra note 29.
352. Id. at 3.
353. Id. at 10.
354. Id. at 30.
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to be mentally ill may be added to the list of fundamental civil liberties.
A person may be perfectly competent under the law to make the deci-
sion that he does not want mental health care (as, for example, a Chris-
tian Scientist) despite being aware that he is in need of mental health
care according to societal norms. For this reason each person must be
given the freedom to choose or refuse mental health care.
Requiring the highest standard of proof and a unanimous jury ver-
dict will undoubtedly create problems in the treatment of the mentally
ill, as Justice Clark pointed out. It must not be felt that the decision in
Roulet II signals the end of all mental health problems. Requiring a
higher standard of proof may be a milestone for those people who do
not belong in the mental health system, but for those who do, as Justice
Clark noted, Roulet II may be a roadblock to treatment and freedom
from mental illness. The present system still labors under the problem
engendered by people who do need mental health care but who, be-
cause they can appear competent for a brief court appearance, will not
te civilly committed. For these people the Roulet II decision, requir-
ing the highest standard of proof, may mean that they will not receive
mental health treatment except on a voluntary basis. But if they are
severely mentally ill, they may not recognize the need for treatment.
Roulet II represents a decision which mandates procedural safe-
guards in response to the demonstrated effects of civil commitment
upon individual liberty and reputation, but which also has the potential
for hindering the treatment of those whofn the California Supreme
Court sought to protect. It demonstrates that, ultimately, the solution
to the problem of treating the mentally ill must come from within the
medical profession and not from the courts.
